Our options for preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability are becoming less and less promising. I will outline four options for heading off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.

One option is for the U.S. to enter into negotiations with Iran, either bilaterally or within a multi-national framework. U.S.-Iranian engagement along these lines may have been productive in mid-2003 because, in the wake of the victory in Iraq, the United States was riding high and the Iranians thought they would be next.
The IAEA was inspecting Iran and found many examples of Iranian cheating and Tehran was on the defensive. U.S. relations with Russia were good at the time.
To most Iranians, enrichment was what corrupt mullahs did to line their pockets.

In those circumstances, Iran made an overture to the U.S. via the Swiss, offering
to talk about the full range of issues that divided the two countries. Convinced that it was in a strong position, and that it could eventually achieve its objectives in Iran without bargaining, the Bush administration dismissed this offer in 2003.

Today the situation is very different; Iran is in the driver’s seat. The U.S. is bogged down in Iraq and its reputation and influence have declined. Ahmadinejad is President, and his provocative rhetoric has gained support for Iran – even in the Sunni Arab street. Russia is pursuing a foreign policy independent of, and often in opposition to, the U.S., and Iran feels Russia will block any tough sanctions in the UNSC. Given these circumstances, Iran’s leaders feel little pressure to give up their enrichment program. Given what is going on, now is not the right time for negotiations.

A second option is military strikes against nuclear facilities in Iran and perhaps their regime power centers. There are two benefits to this: it can be done soon – which is especially important if the goal is to prevent Iran’s mastery of centrifuge enrichment technology. No other option has this advantage. The second benefit is that it would almost surely disrupt the enrichment effort. We don’t know where all of Iran’s nuclear related facilities are located. However, we do know that they produce UF6 in Isfahan, enrich Uranium in Natanz, and are building facilities to produce plutonium.

Iran is widely assumed to be engaged in some covert activities today, but most experts doubt that Iran is now operating a covert enrichment facility. So its enrichment activity at Natanz is a key pacing factor—probably the key pacing factor – in its nuclear program.

We know where their main targets are and convential armed missiles should be able to put them out of business, but for how long? How long would it take Iran
to regenerate? Depending on how successful they would be, regenerating their program could take six months to six years. Therefore, the principal benefit of
a strike and producing, hiding and centrifuges is uncertain, while the costs of
a strike are very high. We can expect the Iranians to retaliate by using asymmetric means like supporting terrorist attacks against U.S. friends and interests in the Middle East, violence and impending shipping in the straits of Hormuz escalating in Iraq.

A few Arab leaders might privately support a strike, but we could expect a very strong backlash that would make it hard to mobilize international support around the world for continuing efforts to isolate, pressure, and contain Iran. We need that international support. For these reasons, military strikes are no ones first option. There is a small chance that force will be used. If other options continued to look unpromising, that likelihood will increase.

A third option is a regime change using overt and covert means of bringing about fundamental change in the Iranian government. A benefit of the regime change, aside from the human rights benefits and good governance, is that leaders would be more responsive to the Iranian people who might be less inclined to pay the economic and political price for the nuclear program. But there are serious problems with counting on a regime change to solve the Iranian nuclear issue. Despite widespread discontent inside Iran for the regime, the Mullah’s grip on power remains strong.

Ahmadinejad, his policies, and his rhetoric have come under strong criticism – from reformers and conservatives alike – but there appears to be little inclination or capability to take on the regime itself. Regime change is likely to be home grown and not the result of foreign pressures and it will happen someday. It is not likely to happen soon enough to head off Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

That leaves the fourth option: we need to step up the pressures on Iran in hopes to widen fissures inside Iran to change Iran’s behaviors on nuclear issues. Iran has been confident that it could proceed with enrichment without paying much of
a price but this option seeks to re-shape its calculation of costs and benefits.

Resolution 1737 will be used by the Bush administration to justify more pressures in Iran outside the Security Council. We can use America’s economic clout to isolate Iran. We need to urge foreign governments and financial institutions in Europe and Japan to curtail any activity with Iran. The U.S. will maintain a strong military presence in the region. The U.S. is sending a message to Iran that any nuclear activity will be met with a strong response.

It’s too soon to tell if anything will change from these steps. There are signs that reconsideration inside Iran has already begun. Ahmadinejad’s support has gone down. Iran’s Oil Minister is having trouble getting financing for projects because financial institutions are decreasing their cooperation. High inflation is the blame of Ahmadinejad. Businessmen and conservatives have criticized him for being too provocative with the nuclear issue and have called for moderation on the nuclear issue.

What is emerging today is a growing debate that Iran can’t have his cake and eat it too. They can’t proceed with their program while being an active and active part of the international world. What is needed is to continue pursuing this fourth option. We need to build wide international support for ratcheting up the pressure. We need to make it clear to Iran that they are on a self destructive course. But pressure alone will not be sufficient, Iran needs to see benefits if it is to reverse course. What it may prize most is a less threatening relationship with the US.
The US should be prepared to normalize relations with the current regime if it is genuinely prepared to abandon its nuclear program and other unacceptable behavior. But engagement and normalization should not be the first priority. Only when Iran realizes it has little to gain and a lot to lose will engagement be productive. That is why the military option should stay on the table and be credible.