Since the end of the War in Lebanon, 6 months have passed, the Israeli people have been saturated by a gloomy atmosphere, and the public confidence in the army has been undermined.  At the same time, with the end of the military investigations, activities have started to improve the operational readiness, with its target, being first and foremost bolstering the strength of the army and confidence in the army.  For this mission, we demand three partners: the IDF, the government and the Israeli people.

My friends and I are laying the ground work to renew the army and are suggesting a framework for change.   We know and believe that the following suggestions can translate into an executable program.

The first partner- IDF

The key word for a necessary balance is proportion.  The picture that was created after the war is not balanced.  Even in the IDF’s greatest military triumphs, there were failures and problems.  The latest war, exposed deep weaknesses, whose roots are from years past, some of these weaknesses date back to the establishment of the state.

1.       Establishment of the Army as an army of the people: The state of Israel Is a small country with large challenges, who maintains an army which consists of 4% of the entire population, this is eight times larger than the size acceptable to any other western country.  In addition, the security budget is twice or three times as large as these countries.

2.       Lack of operational experience, since the emanate feeling of a threat to Israel’s existence isn’t as relevant as it used to be: you have a generation of commanders that do not have operational experience in wars.  Parallel to this is the public impression that there is no longer a threat to Israel’s existence.  The Iraqi front has been dismantled, there are borders with peace, and therefore there is no need for a large army.  In addition, focusing on the Palestinian sphere has brought a change in the way in which war is fought; however these templates are not relevant to high intensity warfare, such as in Lebanon.

Despite the disadvantages that were previously discussed, the IDF has great strengths and abilities.  The following are the positive components which help create a balanced picture:

1.       How the IDF coped with the Intifada, which started in October 2000:  The armed Intifada presented a challenge, in which the army needed to find a solution. The army was able to find this solution, and the quantitative achievements are evidence of this.  In 2000 the army foiled a low percentage of attacks, however in 2006; the army was able to thwart 96% of attacks.  In addition the number of casualties dropped from 200 in 2002 to 15 in 2006.

2.       Cooperation with other bodies: IDF Incitement to deal with the Palestinians has demanded efforts which are the fruits of cooperation with the Shin Bet, Police, and other bodies.  The fact that there was cooperation is an achievement within itself.

3.       Quality of fighting authorities and the seriousness shown by the reserve duty.

4.       Process of inquiries: Unprecedented determination to reach the truth through all inclusive investigations.

We are suggesting four central directions through which the army can initiate changes:

1.       Strengthening the spirit and quality of organization: The army should be turned into a leading and quality firm: The IDF should put effort into the “programs” rather than into the “hardware”.   We suggest that the IDF should focus its energies on strengthening the army as an organization- development and preservation of knowledge, along with striving to excellency.

2.       Development and application of an operational fitness model as a guide for the army: in other words the model needs to be widened and upgraded; changing it to include daily managerial instruments, through tools which measure to what extent the army is capable of achieving the goals in which the government has set for it.

3.       Improvement of the culture of management: improvement of the ability to take visions and objectives and translate them into defined missions.  Together with this, missions should be measured by output and not by feeling.

4.       Strengthening values: a feeling of partnership, telling the truth, and strengthening of trust between high level officers and their subordinates.

The second partner- Government System

1.       Removing non military mission:  For example transferring the responsibility of the civilian front from the home front command to the civilian authority.  The Sapir Committee and four government decisions have dealt with this.  At the moment the security council is looking for ways in which it can be transferred to the civilian authority.

2.       Setting a budget which reflects the goals the government has set for the army:  this is said in regards to the process in which the budget is defined and not the question of its size.   The final discussion surrounding the budget becomes a compromise that the Prime Minister must make between the army and the Ministry of Finance, without professional advisors.  In our opinion a position needs to be created in the office of the Prime Minister, whose sole purpose is to manage the dialogue between the army and the Ministry of Finance.  This is not a new suggestion, it is important that this is emphasized.

3.       A creation of a multi-annual framework, which will allow improvement to occur in the planning outline.

The third partner- the Israeli people

Here we talk about the need to show responsibility and advance a joint discourse.  If the people do not  admire the army, they are not ready to put their future in its hands.

The direction of change which we presented, depends on a solid basis of knowledge and can be translated in substantial actions.  It is possible to establish a framework in which people like us will voluntarily contribute time to the military, committed to a minimal number of years.  There are excellent people, who are authorities on the issues of security and strategic economy, who once called will rally to the cause.