As the second Lebanon war ended, some things are revealed. In the Israeli “warship” there were problems in the engine room, the weapon and the radar systems, but all and all the interface between men and means functioned. Rust must be removed, but this is always the case in an army which for a long time did not fight a battle. This is encouraging. People know what to do in the tactic field, and are determined to protect their country upon recognizing a just and essential event as this war was.

But in our “national warship” there was a problem on our command deck. Some of the people did not show up, some stood on the deck but you could not understand from them the definition of goals. Where are we sailing? What for? Who do we attack on the way? What aim should we reach? This shock was the bottleneck which caused the IDF not to express its ability properly and fully. This must be investigated and researched. A certain human composition failed here. With the resignation of the Chief of Staff and the commander of division 91 the phase of taking personal responsibility has ended. The rest must bridle their experience to rehabilitate the IDF.

We (Vilnai, Hanegbi and myself) decided to focus on the topic of the IDF senior command and its training. We do not look for guilty people. We would like to examine the process. How did it happen that the IDF power did not come into expression? We would have to examine the course which brings a person to become a chief of regional command. Does he goes through change of mind, change of thinking, of terms from the tactical level to the system strategic level? IDF did not notice an important process of “leadership of knowledge”. Important steps in the training have been lacking, or perhaps lack of coherency between learning and drills. All that is relevant to developing senior military leadership.

The lack of military professionalism in the practical level caused the national security system to go through a process of “alchemy”, a situation of found-less national security concept.  For example, the lack of national existential threat. This is a political wishful thinking which is the most dangerous one.

Other components of this “alchemy” are unilateral withdrawals, which are actually abandoning the battle field. We never heard throughout military history of any such case which succeeded. It did not provide security not in Lebanon, neither in Gaza. You cannot subdue by a messenger, unless we are willing to pay a high price in terms of infrastructure and citizens.  

Second, one must observe an enemy who is building its strength. It is a country’s right and duty to truncate such strengthening processes in the time and place it chooses. 

Third, “measured/proportional use of force” instigation means keeping the enemy’s ability to harm us over time. The accumulated weight of not defeating the enemy means exposing the state of Israel for an existential threat in the longer term.

Forth, regarding the claim that those experiments bear no risk, and if it is found out that we were wrong we can turn the wheel back. Well, in fact, everything that is done is irreversible, or that to reverse it takes a total cost, as just was in Lebanon.

In addition, the defense component which was brought into the security concept is a mistake if it stands on its own. Defending Israel is a whole set of actions (attack, deterrence, etc.). One who speaks on defense alone is doing a mistake. If Israel would be surrounded with an anti-missiles system, and think by this it can defend its citizens, it must understand that defense is only one part of the security system, but not its whole.

To conclude, we have a good army and good commanders, so part of the despair in the public has no place. Our duty now, after the taking responsibility process was completed, is quickly nominating a new chief of staff that would be able to take the IDF forward on a short schedule.