We are falsely waiting for the Vinograd report, as though until now it has been only a partial report, but this is not true. There were two final reports covering two parts of the war, and so it is odd, as though not enough was said and there is a need to wait for more data and information.

The decision to go to war requires experience and the maximum amount of attention. The question of security in Israel is an existential and decisive one. When you go to a war of this sort, you must be certain that there is no other way, you must define the objective, which in its name, our sons are sent to kill and be killed, and you must be certain that this objective is in fact attainable. Unfortunately, not all of these were done and the government and its ministers did not act cautiously, and with the proper consideration in decision making about going to war. This was determined by the Vinograd Committee.

Most Israelis think that if we can do anything and that if it isn't done it's either because we were stopped by the U.S., the U.N. or legal practitioners, or that the Treasury wouldn't allocate enough money for the cause. It is as if only if all of the above do not intervene, we can win. When the world wants us to go to war we don't check to see if it is worthwhile. The government's flaw points to something far deeper, no one thought otherwise, and today according to the report it is clear that that could not have been done.

1.       The world these days is more complex: definitely managing the war, the media, international law and the target which we aim to attack; all of these are much more complex. As a result we would like to see that the decisions are made by the absolute best.

2.       The qualities which cause a person to be elected are not necessarily the qualities which are desirable for running the government and making decisions, and the difference between what you would like and what you have is significant, and should be taken care of.

How should this be done?

1.       The public must also elect the people based on the assumption that they have the required capabilities.

2.       Procedures must be established so that whoever is elected will not deal only with being elected but rather also invest time in learning. You needn't spend more than an hour a day doing so; you only need the will to not be told later "I was told." There is no framework in Israel that is closed to learning.

3.       We must be aided by professional knowledge and experience to not fall into the hands of the chosen representatives no matter how hard they try. Just as when a private company hires a consultant so that its decisions will be the best. This is not always done for public discussions regarding education, budget cuts in relation to the list of subsidized medications, or security decisions. This is not always done and this is a very serious flaw.

A report was written on Israeli Security by Ariel Sharon, Shaul Mofaz and I. The report deals more with long term strategy, maneuvers, and future prospects. Only two items were "immediate":

   1. We must find an immediate solution to short range weapons

   2. There is an immediate need for the establishment of a decision making           apparatus.

Such an apparatus was not found due to power struggles between a minister and his subordinates. The minister would not want to submit his proposal to his subordinate for review. This is another explanation that can't really be proven but is possible. When a party joins the government it comes with an agenda, with a vision, and then the vision meets reality that prohibits its fulfillment. The vision of the complete land of Israel is apparently unattainable, for instance. The Oslo accords as a solution suddenly is suddenly not accepted. The National Security Council presents before the leader a conclusion that the leader doesn't want to hear, and so there is need for an effective apparatus to provide the leader with reality as it really is.