The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya
Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy
Institute for Policy and Strategy

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Herzliya Papers

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Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

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“Then Abram said to Lot: Let there be no strife between you and me and between your shepherds and my shepherds for we are kindred. Is not the whole land before you? Separate yourself from me; if you go left I will go right and if you go right I will go left” Genesis13:8

“There the son of Arabia, the son of Nazareth and my son will be satiated with abundance and happiness” Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the Beitar Anthem

Preface

Since the inception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict many parties – international, regional and the immediate parties to the conflict have aired plans for its resolution. Some of these plans received the backing and official endorsement of governments (the United States, Israel) and international alignments (UN, Quartet, and the Arab League). Others have arisen in academic circles or have been initiatives of political forces with little or no leverage in their respective governments, and therefore choose to act through the civil society and mobilization of public support for their ideas.

Most of the plans for resolving the conflict derive from political and security considerations and are couched in political terms. However, the demographic and economic paradigms incorporated in the political concept are no less critical for the future of the peoples involved.

This document is an attempt to bring together as a compendium the various peace plans, which are on the public agenda today, in a manner which will facilitate comparison and evaluation of their possible repercussions, particularly in the area of the future demography of the State of Israel.

This document is composed of: an overview of the political and economic paradigms of extant peace plans; tables for easy comparison of the elements included in the different plans; documents which present synopsis of the salient geographic and demographic elements of the various peace plans.

The document also includes a set of relevant maps: illustrative maps of some of the peace plans, made especially for this project, since most of the proposed plans do not include integrated maps; maps of alternatives for Jerusalem (the proposals of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies); and maps of historic borders and plans, including the Oslo division of the West Bank.

Official documents and synopses of documents relating to peace plans are included in this document in English. Notwithstanding, some of the original documents in Hebrew and Arabic have also been included when their exact wording warrants it. Synopses of peace plans, which have been formally presented by the authors for public debate, have been approved by their authors.
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Paradigms of Peace Plans

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be characterized as a struggle over geography and demography. Most proposals for its resolution focus on a geographical settlement (i.e. demarcation of borders) with the demographic factor serving as both a driver and derivative of the borders; they are drawn, as much as possible, to accommodate inclusion of Jewish settlement blocs in the borders of the State of Israel and they determine the number of non-Jews included in Israel. Solutions which address the demographic conundrum run the gamut from proposals to induce migration of Palestinians/Israeli Arabs to territorial swaps which leave large populations of Israeli Arabs outside the borders of the State of Israel. Creative solutions to the limits of options for Israeli-Palestinian territorial swaps include regional territorial swaps with third countries even proposals to add land by building artificial islands.

Any attempt to compare the various peace plans inevitably meets with a number of methodological difficulties:

- Many of the plans are embryonic ideas around which a body of interpretation has grown, creating a plethora of variants of each basic plan with no authoritative interpreters.
- No two plans correspond to each other in all issues; while some go into great detail on certain issues, others suffice with stating a few guiding principles. Even when plans go into detail, the areas which their proponents choose to detail do not usually correspond.
- The political paradigms do not usually include a clear corresponding economic plan or vision. Therefore, different economic alternatives are proposed and presented in this document which, when coupled with a specific political plan, can have a profound effect on the very essence of that plan.
- The “final status” plans do not all have a link to a corresponding interim status plan.

An analysis of all the current peace plans leads to the conclusion that the demographic outcome of the various plans does not necessarily derive from the political paradigm as such. For example, whether or not certain settlements are included in the final borders of the State of Israel, the population of the settlements will be included, thus leaving the total population of Jews in Israel unchanged. The size of the non-Jewish population in Israel will be the result of three factors:

1. **Demarcation of borders** (with or without Israeli-Arab towns and villages in the “Triangle” and/or the Arab quarters of Jerusalem) – moving the border to the west of the “Triangle” would reduce the non-Jewish population of Israel by 200 to 250 thousand. Changing the municipal borders of Israeli Jerusalem to exclude Arab quarters could reduce it by another 200 thousand.
2. **Refugee absorption within Israel** – Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria are totally disenfranchised in their host countries. Therefore, it stands to reason that most of them, given the choice, would probably opt for “return” for economic reasons at least and regardless of political and ideological motivation. Given the choice between a relatively affluent Israel and a fledgling Palestinian state, it would seem that the same economic motivation would cause refugees to opt for settlement in Israel.
3. **The economic paradigm** – Political paradigms based on “one state” or “federation” models would, by definition, include a high level of economic integration. Such models, as well as “two states” models, which incorporate
economic models based on a high level of free movement of labor, bear the risk of gradual migration of Palestinians from the poverty–stricken Palestinian periphery to more affluent Israel.

All the peace plans attempt to resolve four main issues: (1) ideological-political demands; (2) demography; (3) security; and (4) economy. Each side has its own vested interest in issues to be included in a peace plan. In addition, there exist the interests of third parties such as Jordan or Egypt, US, EU, UN, Vatican, donors that must be addressed in any outcome of the negotiations. The various interests and issues can be seen in the following table:

**Israeli, Palestinian and International Negotiation Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Issue</th>
<th>Israeli Interest</th>
<th>Palestinian Interest</th>
<th>Other (US, EU, UN, Jordan, Egypt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political issues</strong></td>
<td>Recognition/ formal acceptance of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State; End to Conflict with all Arab States; Cessation of incitement and hostile propaganda; Restrictions on foreign alliances and treaties.</td>
<td>Independence and Sovereignty; Recognition of responsibility for suffering /refugees.</td>
<td>International involvement in oversee of implementation of the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Borders</strong></td>
<td>Demarcation of clear and recognized borders; Preserving areas of Jewish settlement inside Israel (including by asymmetric land swaps in Israel’s favor); Water; Airspace; Areas of joint/limited sovereignty or control; Environment, natural resources, and long term planning considerations with regard to development.</td>
<td>Safe passages; Territorial links between WB and Gaza; Water Freedom of movement.</td>
<td>Land links to Israeli ports (Jordan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>Cessation of Terrorism; Constitution of Palestinian security forces; Areas of security responsibility/authority; Presence of Israeli forces; Early warning and intelligence presence; Border control on international borders/ between Israel and Palestine; Counter terrorism policy (right of pursuit, extradition etc.); Arms limitation and demilitarized zones; no WMD in Palestine, control of coastal border.</td>
<td>Minimal impairment of sovereignty; ensuring a self-defense capability to prevent subversion, cross-border infiltration, etc; presence of international forces; control of coastal border;</td>
<td>Constitution of Palestinian security forces; Counter terrorism policy (right of pursuit, extradition etc.); border controls (Jordan, Egypt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>Relocation of Jewish settlers or arrangements for their remaining in their place. Role and national identity of Israeli Arabs.</td>
<td>Palestinian Citizenship for Palestinians; removal of all settlements and Jewish presence.</td>
<td>Cancellation of Jordanian citizenship of WB Palestinians (Jordan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem and Holy Places</strong></td>
<td>Jerusalem must remain united as Israel’s recognized capital; Status of the Temple Mount; Status of Jewish Holy places; Freedom of worship.</td>
<td>Recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Palestine; Borders of the city; Status of the Temple Mount (Haram).</td>
<td>Jerusalem remaining an “open city”; role of the Vatican; Freedom of worship; Jordanian/Islamic role in the Haram (Jordan; Saudi Arabia; OIC).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees/ “Right of Return”</strong></td>
<td>Resettlement of refugees in “host” countries or others; Quotas/ restrictions on return of refugees; no right of return to Israel; Compensation by international</td>
<td>UN Resolution 194; Return to Israel; Israeli acceptance of responsibility; Formal right of choice; Compensation.</td>
<td>Transparency in funds for refugee rehabilitation and reconstruction.</td>
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## Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

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<th>Economic relationships</th>
<th>Governance of the Palestinian State</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>community; Restriction on return to Israel; Jewish refugees from Arab countries.</td>
<td>Role of Egyptian, Jordanian forces.</td>
<td>Restrictions on absorption of refugees in host countries and third countries. Jordanian, Egyptian extra-regional parties (US, EU, NATO) roles.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jordanian, Egyptian extra-regional parties (US, EU, NATO) roles.</td>
<td>Free movement of Palestinian goods.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free movement of Israeli and goods. Harmonized rate of VAT, purchase tax.</td>
<td>Free movement of Palestinian goods. Free movement of labor and preferential treatment by Israeli labor to Palestinian labor. Passage of goods; Tax agreements; Customs agreements (customs union; FTZ; MFN status).</td>
<td>No outside intervention in form of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The form of government; Authority of the judiciary; Legal relationships between the Palestinian government and Israel.</td>
<td></td>
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### Political Paradigms

The political paradigms for settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict can be categorized in a number of ways: according to the stage of the settlement they deal with (interim or final status plans); by the parties involved (bi-lateral Israeli–Palestinian plans or plans involving additional parties such as trusteeships, federations); by the final result (one state west of the Jordan River, two states or a federation); by the authors of the plans (official governments or leaders who were in office at the time they proposed the plans or representatives of political factions or the civil society); or by the present validity of the plans (plans which are still proposed by their authors and “historic” plans). In the following analysis the basic break-down will be to interim plans and final status plans, with a secondary breakdown to “official” plans and plans proposed by political and academic bodies or individuals. The “final status” plans will be divided into the following categories: “two state solutions”; “one state solutions”; “Jordanian/Federation Options”; “Regional (multilateral territorial swaps) Options”.
Interim Plans

Since the outbreak of the current phase of the conflict ("The al-Aqsa Intifadah") the peace process along the lines of the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords has been in abeyance. This situation has given rise to various plans for unilateral action by Israel, or alternatively a level of international intervention. These plans are based on one or both of the following assumptions: (1) the two parties are not yet ripe to take the strategic decisions necessary to implement solutions, and therefore they need a period of adaptation, or (2) the Palestinians have lost their ability to rule themselves and are in need of a “mandate power” to prepare them for democratic institutions and independence.

The interim plans all extend from the short to the medium range period with transitory periods of three years or more. Furthermore, virtually all of them presume a final settlement paradigm based on a Palestinian state (either completely independent or in a political link with Jordan or Israel) in the WB and Gaza. No interim plans have been offered for “one state” solutions.

The existing plans proposed by official government parties include:

1. **Unilateral Disengagement** – the official plan of the Government of Israel proposed by Prime Minister Sharon at the 2003 Herzliya Conference and accepted by the Government of Israel and the Knesset (see map no. 1).

2. **The Road Map** – the official plan of the United States, and the “Quartet”, which developed on the basis of President Bush’s speech of April 4, 2002. The "Quartet" (U.S., E.U. Russia and U.N.) was formed with the purpose of organizing a Middle East conference later in the summer. On September 17th 2002, the Quartet issued a statement below regarding a road map for peace that has since undergone several revisions. The official text of the latest version of the roadmap was published on May 1, 2003. The plan has been accepted by Israel and the Palestinians.

Variant of the disengagement plan have been offered by private individuals (Arye Haskin’s “Zionist Separation Route”). Palestinian academics have also raised ideas for interim plans based on moderating the effects of the unilateral disengagement and emphasizing an interim period for strengthening the Palestinian economy and civil society. The authors of these plans have not yet formally presented them.

In addition, academic circles in Israel, the United States and among the Palestinians themselves have raised the idea for an interim settlement or process based on “trusteeship”. The crux of all these ideas is the identity of the “trustee” and of the security force, which will take responsibility for the area. These range from a “classic” UN presence, through forces under the command of NATO or the OSCE, US or US-UK forces, and finally Jordanian or Jordanian-Palestinian (PLA) forces. Territorially, these plans are based on the Oslo division of areas A, B, and C (see map no. 20) and the route of the separation fence. The two main plans now on the table of this type are:

- International trusteeship – an idea proposed in detail by Ambassador Martin Indyk, but also promoted previously by former Israeli Foreign Minister, Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami and others. The demand for a temporary international trustee was for some time a consistent Palestinian demand, both in order to facilitate the extrication of the Palestinians from Israeli occupation and to have the international community – and not Israel – hand the Palestinians their State.

- Jordanian/Egyptian trusteeship – This model is a variant of the international trusteeship based on the assumption that regional Arab trusteeship may be
more acceptable to the Palestinians than a foreign or international mandate, on one hand, and that Jordan is the most acceptable of Arab countries for Israel in respect to disruption of terrorism. The Jordanian trusteeship model is, in essence, a substitute for Palestinian security control in areas from which Israel has decided to withdraw in a unilateral disengagement and aims at replacing the unilateral Israeli step with an agreed tri-lateral interim settlement. Ideas for such a Jordanian role have been raised lately in private by senior Palestinians and have been discussed in Palestinian think-tanks. The underlying principle of this model is an assumption that it would eventually lead to a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, based on a referendum by the two peoples.

Final Status Plans

The long-range results of final status peace plans under discussion differ according to the degree that it is assumed that a Palestinian negotiating partner exists and the degree of integration envisaged between Israel and the Palestinian entity. These plans can be broadly categorized into four main political paradigms: “two states” plans; “one state” plans; federation (mainly “Jordanian options”) plans; regional territorial swap plans. Some of these paradigms have given rise to one or more formal plans. Others have remained in the realm of academic discussion. In the case of the former, the relevant documents will be presented in this paper. Regarding the latter, the general principles will be presented as they transpire from the public debate.

The end result of these plans – if they were implemented – would depend on variables of external geo-political and socio-economic factors and the involvement of third parties in the peace plan: Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in the first level, and the rest of the Arab world in the second. The lack of cooperation by these parties would have an impact on the feasibility of the plan. Some variables are subject to quantitative analysis (water, natural resources, population growth, and security considerations). The ultimate form that a process may bear would also derive of “soft” variables such as national identities (of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and Jordanians), irredentism, social-religious trends and so forth, which cannot be objectively assessed.

The distinction between “one state”, “two states” and federal solutions is not always clear-cut. This ambiguity is inherent in the difficulty to draw a line between federal, confederal and united entities and it is further complicated by mechanisms for the implementation of the “right of return”, which many claim turn the slogan of “two states for two peoples” into “two states for one (Palestinian) people”.

“Two states” plans

These plans are based on Israeli withdrawal from parts or all of the West Bank and Gaza and repartition of the land west of the Jordan River between Israel and the Palestinians. These solutions are based on the need to (1) separate between Israel and the Palestinians; (2) provide the Palestinians with a real sense of national independence. Along with the territorial issue (including Jerusalem) the core dispute in these plans lays in two inter-related issues: recognition of Israel’s right to exist as the Homeland of the Jewish People (i.e. recognition of Jewish right to self determination and not merely Israel’s existence); and the “right of return” of Palestinians on one hand, and of the Jews to Israel, on the other hand.

The “two states” solution may include ideas for border changes, beginning from the “minor border modifications” and ending with territorial swaps with Egypt, Jordan or even Syria and Lebanon.

Three plans of this paradigm have been officially presented by governments or international organizations. These include:
1. **The “Camp David Offer”** – the Israeli proposal presented by PM Ehud Barak to the Palestinians in the Camp David Summit (July, 2000) and later in Taba (December 2000). The “offer” includes far-reaching territorial concessions and first-time Israeli willingness to contemplate concessions on Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. The offer was formally “valid” only during the negotiations and no single element therein was meant to be taken separately (“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”). Nevertheless, it is widely perceived among the Palestinians as a point of departure for further negotiations (see map no. 4).

2. **The American Presidential Concept** – This is a set of principles based on the positions of two consecutive US administrations and which is presumed to be the basic concept which guides US policy towards the structure of the final settlement. The basic document is “the Clinton Parameters” – the positions, which guided the American delegation in Camp David and were presented to the parties by President Clinton in December 2000. While the “Clinton Parameters” were presented by the President himself as valid only until he leaves office, they remain a valid representation of the basic US position, which has been adopted by the subsequent Bush administration with modifications based on President Bush’s letter to PM Ariel Sharon and his statements during Sharon’s visit to Washington in April 2004 (see map no. 3).

3. **The Arab League (Saudi) Peace Plan** – This plan is the official collective position of the Arab league and of all constituent members towards the Israeli-Palestinian settlement. It is formulated in the resolutions of the Arab Summit in Beirut (March 2002). The plan is a compromise between the Saudi plan and Syrian positions and therefore refrains from controversial formulas such as recognition of Israel’s “right to exist” or its essence as a Jewish State. The plan is based on a total Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, along with “remaining occupied territories in the south of Lebanon” (a reference to the Shab’ah zone of the Golan, but also to Misgav Am, the Hasbani Bridge area and other areas now on the Israeli side of the 2000 line of withdrawal that Lebanon claims are within the Lebanese international borders). The plan also calls for full repatriation of refugees, rejecting all forms of resettlement of refugees “which conflict with the special circumstances of the host countries (e.g. Lebanon)” (see map no. 5)

Three additional “two state” solution plans have been offered by public figures or academics. These include:

1. **The Peoples Voice** – a set of principles proposed by Admiral (ret.) Ami Ayalon and Prof. Sari Nusseibeh (The Peoples Voice does not present a map, though it states that the borders will be based on the 1967 lines with equitable (1:1) border modifications. For the 1967 lines, see map no. 18).

2. **The Geneva Initiative** – a “model” agreement drawn up by a team headed by Dr. Yossi Beilin and Yaser Abd Rabo (see map no. 2).

3. **Israel-Palestine territorial swap** – Exchange of Israeli-populated areas in the West Bank in return for Israeli-Arab towns and villages (the “Triangle”, Wadi Ara) and some Arab villages and suburbs east of Jerusalem. This swap is the basis for a plan raised in Israeli academic circles (Prof. Arnon Sofer) and recently by Avigdor Lieberman (“Israel Beiteinu” party). (The “Israel Beiteinu” plan does not present a map. For
an illustrative map of possible Israeli–Palestinian swap alternatives, see map no. 6).

“One state” Plans

These plans are based on the existence of only one state west of the Jordan River. This concept implies one of the following sub-paradigms of relationships between the individual and the state: (1) community-oriented distinguishing between “nationality” and “citizenship” (defining each citizen’s affiliation as Jewish or Palestinian as the frame of reference for his relationship with the state); (2) individual-oriented - a “state for all its citizens”; (3) extra-territorial citizenship – distinction between residency and citizenship; (4) Disfranchisement – “transfer” (either by force or by “encouragement of emigration” through pressures and enticements) of the Palestinian population to Arab countries, particularly Jordan, which would then be defined as the “Palestinian State”, i.e. the expression of Palestinian self determination.

No government has formally adopted a “one state solution”, though the concept has received increasing currency in Europe. The plans of this type have all been promoted by public figures. They include:

1. **“De-Zionization” of Israel – one “bi-National” or Arab state west of the Jordan River** – this is achieved by a state in which the national identity of the state is determined by the majority, which due the existing demography of the area and the implementation of the “right of return” would be an Arab-Palestinian state. This goal is inherent in the idea of a “bi-national Jewish-Palestinian state” or a single democratic “state for all its citizens” as proposed by MK Azmi Bishara, which has not been formulated as a coherent plan). This concept has gained growing currency in European circles (see map no. 7).

2. **One Jewish state west of the Jordan River** – this is achieved by application of Israeli sovereignty over the WB and Gaza, without granting them citizenship and by “dismantling” the refugee camps by transferring their inhabitants to outside of Israel (including WB and Gaza) and encouraging emigration (“transfer”) of Palestinians in general. A main variant of this concept is based on seeing Jordan as the “Palestinian State” (see below) or the creation of a “Palestinian state” in some other territory (the plan by MK Efi Eitam for a “Palestinian State” in Sinai). The territorial expression of a plan based on Israeli sovereignty over the entire area west of the Jordan River is expressed in map no. 7 (Bi-National State). The demographic expression depends on the policy towards the Palestinian population.

3. **An Israeli-Palestinian Federation** – a Palestinian State would be founded on the basis of a federative link with Israel. Such a link would provide for continuity of national identity in both parts of the “federation” but create a united entity in terms of economics, defense, security and international relations (see map no. 8).

4. **A confederation of two non-contiguous reduced-sovereignty states west of the Jordan**, based on dividing the WB alone or the entire area west of the Jordan River into small national administrative units (cantons). Such ideas have been based on areas A, B, C or on old Ottoman divisions of land (For such a concept, based on area A, B, C, – see the Oslo Map no. 20).
**Paradigms of Peace Plans**

**Plans based on “Jordanian Options”**

Jordan has numerous vested interests in the form of settlement of the Palestinian problem and particularly in the shape of the Palestinian entity that will be created in the West Bank. First and foremost of these interests is the desire to preclude any process of “Palestinization” of the Hashemite Kingdom. At the same time, Israel and the some external players have occasionally seen an interest in an enhanced Jordanian involvement in the process and the product of the negotiations. Other interests of Israel and parts of the international community in favor of a “Jordanian option” include: the desire to mitigates Palestinian radicalism by linking Palestine to the moderate Jordanian regime; the need to deal with de-militarization of the Palestinian entity (restriction of its sovereignty) by linking it to a wider sovereign state; and the assessment that a Palestinian State in the West Bank would not be economically viable and would need an economic “hinterland”.

Jordan’s “severance” of ties with the West Bank (1988) came out of Jordanian apprehension that the “Intifadah syndrome” - a meltdown of political and social authority – may “spill over” into Jordan. This apprehension grew in the wake of the “al-Aqsa Intifadah”, the accelerated disintegration of the PA and Palestinian society and Israel’s own plan for unilateral disengagement. As Israel disengages and “seals itself off” from the Palestinians, Jordan fears that it would be under domestic and Arab pressure to open its doors to the Palestinians. Without the traditional outlet of Palestinian immigration to the Gulf countries, the population of disgruntled and disenfranchised Palestinians in Jordan would swell and destabilize the country.

Consequently, voices in diverse circles in Jordan and among senior Palestinians have called for a review of the future of the relations with the Palestinians, and possible re-engagement in the process through revival of ideas for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, a trilateral “Benelux” type Jordanian-Palestinian–Israeli federation, Jordan as a “Motherland” for Palestinian–Jordanian citizens or cantons in the West Bank and Gaza, and even Jordanian involvement in an interim “trusteeship period” in the West Bank and Gaza, a loose confederacy between two sovereign States.

The main elements of any “Jordanian option” which are usually addressed include:

- The **national identity of the State(s)** involved in the option (Jordan, Palestine as a State or a lesser entity, with or without Israel).
- The **identity of the regime** – a Hashemite monarchy; a “republic”; or a hybrid monarchy-republic with joint elements of sovereignty.
- The **internal and external borders** of the “Jordanian-Palestinian” entity.
- **Source of authority** (is authority in the hands of the wider “State” and delegated to the lower level or vice versa).
- **Restrictions** on the two parts of the State in areas of defense and security, economy and finance, etc.
- The fate of the **refugees** within the borders of the future State and of those refugees who will return according to a “law of return”.
- **Interlinking of economic and physical infrastructure**.

These plans include various combinations of links between three parties: Israel, Palestine and Jordan. The three main paradigms are:
1. **Jordanian-Palestinian Federation/Confederation** (The Jordanian “United Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine” plan of 1972; the Hussein-Arafat Accord of 1985) (see map no. 9)

2. **Israel-Jordan-Palestine Federation/Confederation/Union** (an idea raised by Prince Hassan of Jordan) (see map no. 10).

3. **Jordan as Palestine** (or “Jordan as an alternative Palestinian Homeland” in Jordanian terminology) – According to this concept, Jordan is the formal expression of Palestinian national identity and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would hold Jordanian citizenship and have voting rights in Jordan, while residing in the WB or Gaza. This concept distinguishes between “citizenship”, “nationality” and “residence”. This is the concept of the plan proposed by MK Benny Elon (“Moledet/ National Union”) (see map no. 11).

**Plans for Regional Territorial Swaps**

The concept of territorial swaps is inherent in most peace plans. The basis of these swaps is that each side preserves its basic entitlement in territory, but the specific territory and borders can be manipulated to suit demographic and security interests. The “entitlement” in this context is not limited to the size of territory but takes into account the “quality” of territory and its significance for the party that receives it. Therefore, a “trade-off” is possible in which one side may receive less “land” in size but equal in terms of national interests.

The Barak proposal at Camp David and the subsequent Clinton parameters included Israeli annexation of settlement blocs in return for ceding Israeli territory (inside the “green line”) to the Palestinian state. The Geneva Initiative and the “Peoples Voice” also envisage a limited swap in which Palestine cedes to Israel blocs of settlements and Israel cedes to Palestine non-populated areas within the “green line” (the wording of “the Peoples Voice” does not preclude transfer of populated areas). The ratios for these swaps range between symmetric swaps (1:1) to swaps in Israel’s favor of 6–7% of the total area of the WB to be annexed to Israel in return for an area within the 1967 borders accounting for 1–3% of the area of the WB that Israel will transfer to Palestine. A more far-reaching option, which has been raised in Israeli circles from left and right, expands the concept to include a swap of Israeli Arab towns and villages for additional territory in the West Bank, thus allowing for annexation of Jewish settlements and reducing the non-Jewish population within the final borders of the state of Israel. This latter concept is discussed in the context of “two states” plans.

Along with the above concepts of bilateral territorial swaps, two plans have been brought up which deal with “regional territorial swaps”. The rationale behind these plans is that:

1. The entrance – particularly through the “Clinton parameters” – into the political discourse of the Israeli-Arab conflict of **the idea of territorial swaps as a solution to demographic and security conundrums**. President Bush’s position that the final borders in the Israeli-Palestinian case cannot ignore the events of time and must also reflect demographic and humanitarian considerations strengthens this trend.

2. The fact that the **options for territorial swaps between Israel and the Palestinians are limited** and can be enhanced only by involving third party countries in the solution.

3. **Precedents in the Arab world of modification of “colonial” boundaries** through territorial swaps (Jordan with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria, Syria’s de
facto acceptance of the loss of Alexandretta/ Hatay to Turkey) show that these boundaries – not to mention artificial lines which were the results of hostilities such as the 1949 Armistice lines and the pre-June 1967 lines – should not be considered “sacred” and immutable.

When applied to the Syrian theatre, one may add to the above that:

1. Since the last bout of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, the leadership has changed in both countries.
2. The principle of maintaining the entitlement to territory may allow the current Syrian regime to claim that it is loyal to its principles, as Syria does not “lose territory” in the end sum.
3. The Israeli demand for a line on the Golan would be based on the above principles of security considerations (defense of the Jordan, Lake of Tiberius); demographic and humanitarian constraints (to reduce the need to move settled population)

The two plans based on regional territorial swaps include:

1. Israel-Palestine-Egypt – Egypt cedes to Palestine (Gaza) territory south-west of Gaza; in return Israel cedes to Egypt territory in the western Negev and a corridor to Jordan; Palestine cedes to Israel settlement blocs in the West Bank. Plans of this type have been raised, inter alia, by Prof. Yehoshoua Ben Aryeh, and in a partial form by Israel Harel (see map no. 12).
2. Israel-Jordan-Syria- Israel will continue to hold the Golan Heights up to a line roughly along the cliffs including the city of Katsrin; Syria is compensated for the territory left in Israeli hands by Jordan along the Syrian-Jordanian border and in the al-Hama area; Israel compensates Jordan in the Araba valley (see map no. 13).

Each of these concepts stands alone. However, any two or all three of them may be combined. The map that would emerge from such swaps (see map no. 14) would have implications not only for the countries involved. While there have been minor border modifications between countries in the Middle East (e.g. Jordan and Saudi–Arabia, Jordan and Iraq) it would represent the first fundamental change in borders in the Middle East since colonial times and may indicate that such changes may be the solution for other conflicts (Iraq).

**Creation of Land**

Along with the classic solutions of demarcation of existing territory and the more creative ideas of territorial swaps, proposals have arisen for “increasing the pie” by creation of territory. The rationale behind these ideas is that not only the borders themselves and the population are variables, but also the topography itself and the conflict over land can be better resolved by creating more land.

Two proposals in this spirit include:

1. A proposal by the Israeli Ministry of Trade and Industry for construction of artificial islands in the Mediterranean Sea (off the shores of Tel Aviv and Gaza).
2. A proposal (Moshe Tsvikel) for drying land on the eastern shore of the Lake of Galilee (the Kineret) in order to facilitate a settlement with Syria, which would not jeopardize Israel’s total control of its mains source of sweet water.

**Issues regarding Jerusalem**

The question of Jerusalem is central to almost all the Peace Plans on the table. A number of maps have been drawn (see map of Jerusalem no. 15) to deal to cut the “Gordian Knot” of reconciling the idea of a united Jerusalem with security, economic,
religious and demographic considerations. The primary issues which are addressed in the plans for Jerusalem are:

1. The status of the city as the **capital of Israel** and/or of Palestine;
2. **International interests in Jerusalem** – Israel committed itself in the “Washington Declaration” with **Jordan** to "respect the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Moslem holy shrines in Jerusalem.". The **Vatican** and the **Islamic Conference Organization** have all also expressed interests in the fate of the city;
3. **Municipal borders of the city** or of a “Zone of Jerusalem” – In 1967 Israeli West Jerusalem was 38 sq. km and Jordanian East Jerusalem only 6 sq. km. The present area of the city is 126 sq. km. This includes Jewish neighborhoods (but not suburbs such as Ma'ale Edomim and Givon). The Palestinian side sees these neighborhoods as “settlements” and not included in Jerusalem and claims that the idea of the "enlarged Jerusalem" is basically an extension of the Israeli territory on the expense of Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Various alternatives for borders of Jerusalem (the "Jerusalem Envelope") have been floated. Some of these include: the present borders of municipal jurisdiction; “Greater Jerusalem” (including suburbs which are dependent on the Jerusalem “metropolis” such as Givon, Pisgat Ze’ev and Ma’aleh Adumim); demographic borders (reducing the number of non–Jews within the borders of Israeli Jerusalem);
4. **Passage from Israel and Palestine to Jerusalem** (in concepts which keep it a united city);
5. Definition of the core area of the city (the “**Holy Basin**”);
6. The **name** of the city or part so fit (Jerusalem/ al–Qods);
7. **Sovereignty** over the various quarters of the city, particularly over the holy places in general and the Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif);
8. Practical control (**jurisdiction**) over the holy places;
9. **Freedom of worship** in the holy places;
10. Preservation of historic and religious sites, including restriction on **archeological digs**.

**Economic Paradigms**

The main focus of all peace plans is, naturally, on basic political aspects such as sovereignty, borders and security. However, since their aim is the achievement of a durable settlement, any evaluation of any plan must take into account not only the direct effects of its political paradigm, but its indirect demographic and social ramifications and the relevant economic paradigm associated with it.

While a variety of ideas and “economic annexes” to the peace plans have been proposed to enhance the stability of the political settlements, these are usually not specifically associated with one plan or another. Moreover, ideas for “federations”, “confederations” “economic unions” may ostensibly present a “two state solution” but have in them economic elements characteristic of the “one state” solution and have profound effects on the demography and economies of the involved countries.

Since the Oslo Accords were signed, a number of proposals have been raised for the structure of future economic relations between the State of Israel and the Palestinian state. The point of departure – the Paris protocol – is widely criticized as asymmetric in Israeli’s favor. However, in the light of the basic asymmetry between the Israeli and the Palestinian economies, all the current proposals for economic agreements are lopsided in favor of Palestinian economic interests.
The paradigms for the economic relationship between Israel and the future Palestinian entity refer to six main issues: (1) trade agreements; (2) labor; (3) fiscal policy; (4) monetary policy; (5) investment; (6) interim periods. The economic peace plans currently on the table are: (1) “Economic Road Map” by the AIX Group; (2) the IPCRI – Konrad Adenauer Fund plan; (3) the plan of “The Israeli Ministry of Finance Committee for Analyzing the Principles for the Economic Relations between Israel and the Palestinians in a Final Settlement”; (4) and the EPS model. The three main paradigms are:

1. **Economic union** between Israel and the Palestinians (the “Benelux” model, if Jordan is included) – this paradigm is the basis for all the “one state” plans (a bi-national state, a “state for all its citizens”) and for the plans which provide the Palestinians with “self rule” within the framework of continued Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza (Benny Elon’s plan). However, this is also the inevitable paradigm for the “federation” and confederation plans which include Israel in the unified framework (Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian);

2. **Economic cooperation** – this paradigm is the most likely one for most of the “two states” plans. These include “The Peoples Voice” and the Geneva Initiative. This paradigm includes various levels of free trade (see below) with regulated passage of labor.

3. **Closed borders** – this is the paradigm of any unilateral plan which derives of the absence of a Palestinian partner. Even in this paradigm there remains a certain level of passage of goods – mainly from Israel to the Palestinian areas.

The two main issues relating to the economic links between Israel and the Palestinian entity are trade regimes and labor. The Paris Protocol was based on a customs union, which a priori, reduces the economic sovereignty of both sides – but particularly of the weaker side. Nevertheless, the Palestinians agreed to it on the assumption that Israel would, in return for the customs union, leave the Israeli job market open for Palestinians. Today, most of the proposals favor a free trade zone (FTZ), mutual preference for investors of each side and coordination of taxes.

The more critical issue, having security and social implications as well, is the question of **free movement of workers**. This issue becomes even more critical in political paradigms, which assume massive absorption of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state. The considerations in this regard are:

1. **For the Palestinians:**
   1. **In favor** – (a) providing work for a sizeable part of the Palestinian work force will prevent further economic deterioration in the Palestinian areas and enhance stability (though even the most optimistic assessment of the level of Palestinian manual labor that Israel can absorb under such a paradigm is up to 100,000 workers. This would be less than a quarter of the total Palestinian work force);(b) Taxes as income for the Palestinian government;
   2. **Against** – (a) heightened dependence on Israel may have a detrimental effect on the psychology of “nation building”; (b) it may exacerbate animosity towards the visible richer neighbor; (c) a risk of impeding local development of job-creating infrastructure; (e) The dependence on Israeli economy would make the Palestinian economy highly reactive to any changes – political or economic – in Israel; (f) risks to stability as the result of expectations born of the close contact with Israel.
2. For Israel:

1. **In favor** – (a) Raising the standard of living of the Palestinians raises their consumption of (Israeli) goods (in fact the Palestinian economy is so small that this consideration has a marginal effect on the Israeli economy); (b) The Palestinian economy is supposed to serve, potentially, as a bridge to Israeli involvement in the Arab world (this advantage is also limited); (c) Reviving the interdependence between the two societies will benefit the confidence building process and mitigate extremist tendencies by reducing the appeal of radical groups and terrorism. (d) Filling manual labor with low-salary Palestinian laborers has a positive effect on the Israeli job market and on the salaries of Israelis; (e) Filling Israel’s need for manual labor by “commuter” laborers reduces the demand for imported laborers who remain in Israel and the adverse social effects that they represent.

2. **Against** – (a) a certain number of the large body of Palestinian day workers will probably remain in Israel as illegal immigrants; (b) Renewing the close link between Palestinians and Israeli Arabs may have a detrimental effect on the integration of Israeli Arabs into the fabric of Israeli society; (c) the threat of terrorism and crime.

The ramifications of an open economic relationship with Israel are existential for the economy of the Palestinian entity, while for Israel its main significance would be political – to enhance the political stability of its neighbor. In this context, the integration of Jordan into the relationship has little weight. Both the Jordanian and the Palestinian economies are labor intensive and hence competitive vis-à-vis the Israeli economy. Without a far-reaching transformation of the Jordanian economy, its capacity to attract Palestinian laborers will remain limited for the foreseeable future.

**Demographic Implications**

It would seem that for both sides the long-range resolution of the demographic question is, arguably, their most far-reaching strategic interest and hence one of the main drivers towards the various peace plans. From this aspect, the interests of the two parties seem diametrically opposed; while most Israeli thinking places the maintenance of a stable Jewish majority in the State of Israel as a driving strategic factor, the preferred Palestinian paradigm strives to leave the “dream” of a future united historic Arab “Palestine” intact – if not through a political, then by a demographic process.

The relevant demographic data that affects the considerations of all these plans includes: (1) the size of the Jewish populations in Israel and in WB and Gaza; (2) potential for Jewish population growth through immigration (Aliya) of Jews from abroad; (3) number of Palestinians in WB, Gaza; (4) Refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and in the rest of the Palestinian Diaspora. The various plans deal with inclusion or exclusion of these populations in the final picture of the number of Jews and non-Jews in the land west of the Jordan River.

The above factors however are only the starting point for any attempt to develop a picture of how these plans might develop. Other salient factors include: (1) natural population growth; (2) the growth of the work force; (3) education; (4) the status of women; (5) economic and security motivation for refugees in host countries to move to the Palestinian areas (heightened discrimination and persecution, unemployment and poverty).
While the degree of economic relations with the Palestinians may have little direct economic effect on Israel, the demographic consequences of the different political and economic paradigms have potential strategic consequences for both parties. Some of the more obvious ramifications are the following:

1. **Population concentrations** – open borders between Israel and a Palestinian entity (whether it is part of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation or an independent state) would most probably generate a growth in the number of Palestinian workers in the Israeli work market. Since the capacity of the Israeli economy to absorb the Palestinian work force is limited, a natural consequence may be a shift of population to near the Israeli border passages to guarantee employment in Israel.

2. **Economic Migration** – The gap between the economies of Israel on one hand and the Palestinians and Jordan – both labor-intensive economies - on the other hand, would direct economic migration, when possible from both the two latter countries into Israel. As long as the Israeli option exists, the probability that national identity or Jordanian citizenship may engender a trend for migration of Palestinians to Jordan seems small.

3. **Gaza/West Bank** – In most plans Gaza and the West Bank are part of one economic and political entity. The lack of viable economic solution in Gaza may engender migration – planned or dynamic – from Gaza to the West Bank.

4. **Palestinians inside Israeli areas** – in some paradigms, Palestinians will remain in areas which remain under Israeli control. The “canton” plan would create a large body of non-Israeli Palestinians under Israeli control. Other plans based on territorial swaps would also leave a certain number of Palestinians inside Israel as a result of annexation of contiguous areas of Jewish settlement.

5. **Israelis in the Palestinian areas** – in some paradigms there exists, at least in theory, potential for continued Jewish presence in the Palestinian areas. In the past, ideas were floated regarding such a presence even in “two state” settlements with the Jewish settlements enjoying an extraterritorial status or the settlers themselves remaining citizens of Israel but residents of the Palestinian state.

6. **Israeli Arabs** – open ties with the Palestinian entity and family unification may have an effect of encouragement of irredentism among Israeli Arabs. The various plans for territorial swaps have the greatest potential for demographic consequences, particularly the paradigms which call for a swap of Israeli settlement blocs for Israeli-Arab towns. This would raise questions regarding the legality of annulment of citizenship (or exchange of Israeli for Palestinian citizenship) and the change of the civil status of the affected population. Furthermore, the “Israel Beiteinu” plan proposed a change in the civil status of the Israeli Arabs who remain residents of Israel – a change which is not contemplated by any other plan.

7. **Refugees** – Plans for resettlement of refugees – especially those from outside the present Palestinian areas - will have profound influence on the Palestinian economy. On one hand, construction activity has the potential for providing jobs and economic growth. On the other hand, increasing the workforce (and unemployment) with “new immigrants” has a potential for social, political and economic destabilization.
Comparative Table of Final Status Peace Plans
(The following tables include only peace plans with enough detail for comparison)

### General Idea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>A detailed draft agreement: Two states for two people, based on the June 4th 1967 line with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis and return of refugees to Israel on the basis of Israel’s sovereign decision alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people's voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>A general base for negotiation: two states for two peoples with borders based on the June 4th 1967 lines with equitable (1:1) territorial exchange and no “return” of refugees to Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Concept (Clinton &amp; Bush)</td>
<td>List of principles dealing with the key areas of controversy: Two states for two people, based on the June 4th 1967 line with border modifications in Israel’s favor; no right of return of Palestinians to Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</td>
<td>A draft plan proposed to the Palestinians: Two states for two people, based on the June 4th 1967 line with border modifications in Israel’s favor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab League Plan</td>
<td>A statement of general principles acceptable to the Arab consensus and given to conflicting interpretation. Two states for two people, based on full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4th 1967 line in all sectors and right of return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</td>
<td>Israeli sovereignty over the entire area west of the Jordan River. Two states for two people on the two sides of the Jordan River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</td>
<td>A general idea of “de-Zionization” of Israel and turning it into a “state for all its citizens” (e.g. an Arab state) or a bi-national state on the territory of the state of Israel, the west Bank and Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton System</td>
<td>WB and Gaza divided into Jewish and Palestinian “cantons” – the former under Israeli sovereignty and the latter linked together as “Palestine”. Division based on area A,B,C or old Ottoman division of land into private (mulk) and State-owned (miri).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</td>
<td>An exchange of population and territory between Israel and the Palestinians in order to reduce the friction between the two people in Israel and mitigate the demographic and internal threat to Israel. This is accomplished by a swap of Israeli settlements blocs in WB and GS for Israeli Arab towns and villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>A tripartite exchange of territory among Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian authority with economic arrangements (sovereign roadways of one side passing through the territory of the other) as part of the compensation for land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mutual Recognition and “End of Conflict”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>The implementation of this agreement will settle all of the claims of the parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party. Recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood with Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>Both sides will declare that Palestine is the only state of the Palestinian people and Israel is the only state of the Jewish people. Upon the full implementation, all claims on both sides and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Concept (Clinton &amp; Bush)</td>
<td>The Palestinian state is the homeland of the Palestinian people just as the state of Israel the homeland of the Jewish people. The agreement should clearly mark the end of the conflict and its</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Comparative Table of Final Status Peace Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</td>
<td>The State of Israel and the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people: mutually recognize each other’s right to exist in peace and security – each on its own land, inside secure and recognized borders, free of threats or acts of violence. The relations between the Israel and Palestine will be based on peaceful co-existence. The two sides re-affirm that the Palestinian People has the right of self-determination according to international law. The framework agreement on the final status marks the end of the conflict between the two sides. Israel and Palestine will create an atmosphere for peace and lasting reconciliation by legislation to put an end to incitement, terror and violence and enforcing such laws through suitable educational programs in each one’s schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab League Plan</td>
<td>Israel is called on to accept the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. In return the Arab countries will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region; establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</td>
<td>The PA to be abolished. Instead, Israel, the US and the international community will recognize the Kingdom of Jordan as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Israel and Jordan-Palestine will declare the conflict terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton System</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</td>
<td>The two sides will declare that: Israel is the Zionist Jewish State and the Palestinian Authority is the Homeland of the Palestinians. The exchange of population and territory will put an end to all the claims of both sides and both sides will be committed to refrain from further claims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>Agreement will pave the way to a complete cessation of hostilities and to a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Palestine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Borders / territory changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>Based on the June 4th lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis. : Gush Etzion, Alfei Menashe, Elkana, Eitz Efraim, Sha’arei Tikva, Modi’in Ilit, Har Adar, Givat Ze’ev. Ma’ale Adumim, all the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and a strip of land in the West Bank adjacent to Ben-Gurion Airport will be part of Israel. In exchange the state of Palestine would receive territory south-west of Gush-Etzion and East to the Gaza Strip. The total amount of territorial swaps – 124 Km². A corridor, under Israeli sovereignty, will link the WB and Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon on the basis of the June 4, 1967 lines, with border modifications. Those will be based on an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial contiguity, and demographic considerations. The Palestinian State will have a connection between its two geographic areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| US Presidential Concept                       | In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing
### Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Clinton &amp; Bush)</strong></td>
<td>Major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949… Any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities. The Palestinian state will reside on 94-96% of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip. Territorial swaps will include Israel's annexation of 4-6% of the West Bank in return to an area equal to 1-3% of the West Bank that will be given as compensation. The main considerations behind territorial swaps are: settlements blocks, continuity, minimal land annexation, minimal damage to Palestinian settlers. A Palestinian state with territorial continuity. 80% of Israeli settlers shall be under Israeli sovereignty. Israel shall provide the Palestinians with a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which will be under Israeli sovereignty, but will guarantee continuous, uninterrupted Palestinian passage. In case there will be need, land leasing can accompany the territorial swaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</strong></td>
<td>WB – settlement blocs and the area of Latrun – approximately 80 percent of the settlers and 6 percent of the WB – will be annexed to Israel in return for an area of the size of 3 percent of the WB that Israel will transfer to Palestine. An additional 2 percent of the WB will be leased to Israel on a permanent basis. The Gaza Strip will be completely under Palestinian sovereignty and the settlements will be evacuated. The “safe passage” and other Palestinian assets will be counted as part of the area which will be given to Palestine in return for the annexation of parts of the WB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Arab League Plan</strong></td>
<td>Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon (a reference to the Shaba’a area and also to areas inside Israel such as Misgav Am and the Hashbani Bridge).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Regional Path to Peace – Benny Elon</strong></td>
<td>Full Israeli sovereignty on the area from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean. Limited autonomy to Arab population blocks, with political linkage to Jordan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</strong></td>
<td>A bi-national state on the area from the Mediterranean to the Jordan valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton System</strong></td>
<td>The eastern border of Israel will be the Jordan River and Palestine's borders will be according to the June 4 1967 line, with the total territory of the West Bank divided into cantons. The possibility of transfer of Arab towns in the Israeli “triangle” to Palestine is raised. “Cantonization” ideas have been raised based on the traditional Ottoman division of land to private and public or on the basis of areas A, B, and C according to the Oslo Accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</strong></td>
<td>A swap of population and territory between Israel and the Palestinians. Arab towns (such as Um al–Fahem, Tayibe, Baqa’a al–Gharbiya, Kafar Qassem) in the “Triangle” and villages and suburbs (such as a-Ram, Jabel Mokabar) east of Jerusalem, should remain outside of the borders of the State of Israel. In return, Israel will apply its sovereignty over Jewish population centers in Judaea and Samaria. As a result of the swap of lands and population, the number of Muslim Israeli Arabs will be reduced by 450 thousand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel-Palestine-Egypt Swap</strong></td>
<td>Israel will transfer between 250-500 km² from the Paran Desert in the Negev and a road that will traverse the Negev and connect Egypt with Jordan. Egypt, in turn, will transfer between 500-1000 km² of land south-west of Rafah in the direction of al-Arish to the Palestinian authority. The Palestinians will agree to transfer between 500-1000 km² in the West Bank to Israel. The area Israel will receive includes: Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, across the “green line”, including the area of Ma’ale-Edomim; the large settlement-blocks like Ariel and Gush Etzion;</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Comparative Table of Final Status Peace Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Geneva Initiative</strong></td>
<td>Israel will absorb settlement blocs that contain 110,000 settlers, in addition to the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem which include 200,000 Israelis. 110,000 Israelis living in 120 out of 140 West Bank settlements, and all settlements in the Gaza Strip, will be evacuated. No Palestinians are annexed to Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</strong></td>
<td>After establishment of the agreed borders, no settlers will remain in the Palestinian State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Presidential Concept (Clinton&amp; Bush)</strong></td>
<td>80 percent of the settlers in blocs will be annexed to Israel (though not stated explicitly – the rest will be evacuated).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</strong></td>
<td>80 percent of the settlers in the WB will be annexed to Israel; all settlements in Gaza will be evacuated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Arab League Plan</strong></td>
<td>No reference. It may be inferred that the Israeli withdrawal includes all civilian presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</strong></td>
<td>No evacuation of settlements. Evacuation of the refugee camps and rehabilitation of their populations outside the state of Israel. The Arab population in the areas that will be moved under Israeli sovereignty will be allowed to stay there, but will have a Jordanian citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton System</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)** | The plan is applicable without expelling Jews or Arabs from their lands or homes, but rather by moving the border alone. The swap of lands and population must be complemented by an amendment of the Israeli citizenship law, which would apply equally to Jews and Arabs without discrimination and provide equal rights and duties to all the citizens of the state. The new law would include:  
  - **An oath of allegiance** – At the time of receiving or replacing an identity card, any person desiring to receive or keep Israeli citizenship will pledge allegiance to the State of Israel and its symbols (the Declaration of Independence, the flag and the national anthem). Any person who refuses to do so will be accorded status of permanent resident but will lose his citizenship and his right to vote or to be elected to public office.  
  - **Military service** – Every citizen will be obligated to military service. Ultra–religious Jews and Muslim Arabs will be obligated to serve in “civil service” (in hospitals, retirement homes, schools, etc.) in their areas. An ultra–religious Jew or Arab Muslim who volunteers for military service will have to receive special permission from the security authorities. Any person who refuses to perform military or civil service will lose his citizenship and his right to vote or to be elected to public office. |
| **Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap**              | 80% of the settlers remain in their homes. No reference to Palestinians in areas that transferred to Israel. Bedouin in the area transferred from Egypt to the Palestinians can remain under Palestinian sovereignty or receive compensation and move to other places in the Sinai Peninsula. |
## Security arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Geneva Initiative</strong></td>
<td>Palestine shall be a <strong>non-militarized state</strong>, with a strong security force, with limitations on the weapons it may hold, as stated in an annex to the agreement. Both sides are obliged to take efforts against all aspects of violence and terrorism and incitement, including disbanding hostile military alliance. Parties establish a high level Joint Security Committee. A Multinational Force shall be deployed in the state of Palestine. This force shall protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine and help in the enforcement of anti-terrorism measures. Small <strong>Israeli military presence</strong> in the Jordan Valley, under the authority of the MF, for a period of 36 months. Two Israeli early warning stations in the northern and central West Bank. <strong>Airspace</strong> - The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements. The Israeli Air Force shall be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</strong></td>
<td>The Palestinian State will be <strong>demilitarized</strong> and the international community will guarantee its security and independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Presidential Concept</strong> (Clinton &amp; Bush)</td>
<td>Palestine shall be defined as a <strong>non-militarized state</strong>. In addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes. After the Israeli withdrawal, a small Israeli presence in fixed locations would remain in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another thirty six months. Israel should maintain three early warning stations on the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. (Subject to review after 3 years). Emergency deployments – maps of relevant areas and routes should be worked out. The state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</strong></td>
<td>Israel and Palestine will refrain from any military, political or economic alliance or confederation with third parties whose interests contradict those of the other party to the agreement without prior consultation and agreement with the other party. The <strong>de-militarized</strong> Palestinian State will maintain a police and domestic security force with land and sea elements for domestic security, law-enforcement and counter-terrorism. Israel, for defense of its vital interests, will maintain a presence of a land force and early warning installations in area which will be decided upon. In case of an imminent threat, Israel may, with prior notice to Palestine, to temporarily increase its forces in certain areas for the period of said threat. Though Israel and Palestine recognize each other’s sovereignty over their air space and electro-magnetic spectrum, due to the fact that the air space and electro–magnetic spectrum of the two countries are practically indivisible, and out of deference to Israel’s defense interests, the two sides will agree that the air space will remain under Israeli administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Arab League Plan</strong></td>
<td>The Arab States … will provide security for all States of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Regional Path to Peace</strong> (Benny Elon)</td>
<td>The leading terrorists and inciters shall be deported, the Palestinian authority shall be dismantled and Israel would cease to see it as a legitimate political body. The IDF shall hold full security responsibility in all the territory west of the Jordan River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</strong></td>
<td>No reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton System</strong></td>
<td>The cantons-area will be de-militarized of any Palestinian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Comparative Table of Final Status PeacePlans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</th>
<th>Only total destruction of the operational, financial and propaganda infrastructure of the terrorist organizations will achieve an end to the conflict. Doing so will force the political forces of the Palestinian Authority to clearly renounce terrorism as a means for achieving political goals. The Palestinian Authority will be de-militarized. It will not have the right to make alliances and no foreign military forces may be stationed within its borders.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>Areas transferred to Egypt come under provisions of the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Border policy and international borders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>There shall be a border regime between the two states, with movement between them subject to the domestic legal requirements of each and to the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party, on its side of the border, can take whatever measures it deems necessary to prevent unauthorized breaches of the border. All international border crossings shall be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the PSF (Palestinian security forces) and the MF. Both forces have the authority to block the entry of items into Palestine. In case of a dispute – the final decision will be by the Implementation Verification Group (IVG). This arrangement shall be subjected to re-examination after five years. Cargo terminals - Israel may maintain an unseen presence, for thirty months, in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>Will be determined by negotiation by the leaderships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Concept (Clinton&amp; Bush)</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</td>
<td>Corridors for joint use will be set up in Israeli and Palestinian territories for local movement of people, vehicles and goods. A safe passage will be set up between the WB and Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab League Plan</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</td>
<td>Not relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton System</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### International involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>Multi-national force in Palestine. An Implementation Verification Group (IVG), including the US, Russian Federation, EU, UN and other parties, shall be established to assist, monitor and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of the agreement. International Commission and International fund to implement solution of refugee issue. International cultural heritage preservation role and policing role in the old city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people’s voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>International involvement in the security arrangements and the refugee issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Presidential Concept (Clinton &amp; Bush)</strong></td>
<td>International involvement in border-security, as well as in the Israeli early-warning stations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</strong></td>
<td>International involvement in the refugee issue, and in creating a safe and stable region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Arab League Plan</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</strong></td>
<td>The United states shall lead the &quot;Marshal plan&quot; to rehabilitate the Middle East, especially Jordan. International involvement in the refugee issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton System</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</strong></td>
<td>The international Community will act to dismantle the refugee camps and to re-settle the refugees in their present host countries. Egypt and Jordan will have to take an active part in the improvement of the economic situation of the Palestinian population and in security responsibility for the territories: Egypt in the Gaza Strip and Jordan in Judea and Samaria. If they refuse to cooperate in improving the situation in the territories, Israel should use its influence with influential Jewish organizations in the United States to put an end to the aid that they receive from the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel-Palestine-Egypt Swap</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Jerusalem and holy sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Geneva Initiative</strong></td>
<td>The Parties shall have their mutually recognized <strong>capitals</strong> in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status as Capital</strong></td>
<td>The Parties shall have their mutually recognized <strong>capitals</strong> in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Borders</strong></td>
<td>According to a detailed map based on Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. The Parties view <strong>the Old City</strong> as one whole, of a unique character, within which movement will be free. Entry and exit points into and from the Old City will be staffed by the authorities of the state under whose sovereignty the point falls, with the presence of <strong>PU</strong> (Old City Police Unite) members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holy Places</strong></td>
<td>The <strong>Temple Mount</strong> compound will be under Palestinian sovereignty, with a multinational presence in the compound. The state of Palestine shall be responsible for maintaining the security of the Compound, with assistance of the security detachment of the Multinational Presence. Visitors shall be allowed access to the site, without any discrimination. No digging excavation or construction allowed on the compound without mutual consent. Palestinians recognize the unique cultural and religious significance of the site to the Jewish people. The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty. The <strong>Western Wall Tunnel</strong> shall be under Israeli administration. The two Jerusalem municipalities shall coordinate. Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon the transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside. <strong>Holy sites</strong> - The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, including the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparative Table of Final Status Peace Plans</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The People’s Voice (Ayalon–Nusselibeh)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status as Capital</strong></td>
<td>Jerusalem will be an open city, the capital of two states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Borders</strong></td>
<td>Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holy Places</strong></td>
<td>Freedom of religion and full access to holy sites will be guaranteed to all. Neither side will exercise sovereignty over the holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be the Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy sites will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Presidential Concept (Clinton &amp; Bush)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status as Capital</strong></td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Borders</strong></td>
<td>Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holy Places</strong></td>
<td>The <strong>Haram/ Temple Mount</strong> – two formulas are proposed: Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram, and Israeli sovereignty over “the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part” or “the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part”. There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Western Wall. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and “shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram or behind the Western Wall. That way mutual consent would be requested before any excavation takes place in these areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status as Capital</strong></td>
<td>Both sides recognize the universal significance of Jerusalem and its sanctity for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Jerusalem will include the recognized capitals of Israel and Palestine – Jerusalem and al-Qods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Borders</strong></td>
<td>The Zone of Jerusalem (ZOJ) – the area inside the municipal borders of Jerusalem and adjacent populated Israeli and Palestinian areas, comprising of areas under Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty and areas regarding which the sovereignty has yet to be determined – will be managed as one integral functional economic and environmental unit. The two sides will guarantee freedom of movement within the zone of Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holy Places</strong></td>
<td>The “Holy Basin” of Jerusalem – the Old City and the adjacent religious and historic sites – will be placed under a special regime. The two sides are committed to freedom of worship in the holy places and freedom of access to those places. The Temple Mount/ Haram a-Sharif and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron are under divine supervision and are holy Jews and Muslims alike. They will be remain under the jurisdiction of the religious communities which have until now been responsible for them. The Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif will be under Palestinian jurisdiction (except for the Jewish holy site) and Israeli sovereignty. An agreed site on the Temple Mount will be allocated for Jewish worship. The historic character and the archeological artifacts of the temple Mount will be preserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Arab League Plan</strong></td>
<td>East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Regional path to peace – Benny Elon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status as Capital</th>
<th>Unified Jerusalem the capital of the state of Israel.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Borders</td>
<td>Unified Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Places</td>
<td>Israel shall continue to maintain the freedom of worship of the Muslims, as this of the Jews, in all its territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</td>
<td>Jerusalem the capital of the bi-national state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton System</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</td>
<td>The capital of Israel is indivisible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status as Capital</td>
<td>Only the Arab villages and suburbs near the east of the city will be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Places</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>Neighborhoods beyond the June 4th 1967 green line, including the area of Ma'ale-Edomim, will be part of the area transferred to Israel in the territorial swaps. East Jerusalem shall be part of the Palestinian state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Palestinian refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Plan</th>
<th>The Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property to be raised by the international community, a special fund and Israel. The refugees shall have choices for permanent place of residence: the state of Palestine, including the areas transferred to it by Israel as a right for all Palestinian refugees; third countries – in accordance with the numbers they will be willing to accept; the state of Israel, in a number Israel shall decide upon according to its sovereign discretion; Present Host countries, in accordance with their sovereign discretion; Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. Clauses include an end to claims, end of refugee status and phasing out of UNRWA within 5 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People's Voice (Ayalon–Nusseibeh)</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will return only to the State of Israel. The international community will offer compensation to aid refugees willing to remain in their present country of residence, or those who wish to emigrate to third-party countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Concept (Clinton&amp; Bush)</td>
<td>An international fund to deal with refugee compensation. Four options: the state of Palestine and areas transferred to Palestine in the land swap (right of all Palestinian refugees); Rehabilitation in host country; Resettlement in third country; admission to Israel. (Dependent on the policies of those countries). According to President Bush, the right of return of Palestinians shall not be to Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Camp David Offer (the &quot;Barak plan&quot;)</td>
<td>A solution to the refugee problem in all its aspects will be achieved through an international effort, including Israel. The solution will include: return to the State of Palestine; integration in host countries; and emigration to third countries. The right of return of the Palestinian refugees will be valid only in the state of Palestine, and Israel recognizes that right. On a humanitarian basis and in accordance with Israel’s own sovereign discretion, Israel may allow a certain number of refugees to enter its territory. An international fund will allocate the resources for refugee re-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
settlement and rehabilitation. Re-settlement of refugees in the present host countries or in third countries will be done through comprehensive programs for development and rehabilitation. The sides agree that a just solution of the Israeli–Arab conflict must also settle the claims by individual Jews and Jewish communities that left Arab counties or parts of the Palestine mandate area in the wake of the 1948 war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Arab League Plan</th>
<th>Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Path to Peace (Benny Elon)</td>
<td>Israel, the United States and the international community will allocate resources for the completion of the exchange of populations that began in 1948 and the full rehabilitation of the refugees and their absorption and naturalization in various countries. The settlement of the Palestinian refugees outside the state of Israel is part of a &quot;population-swap&quot; – Palestinian refugees' leaving of Israel versus the Jews who left the Arab states. A limited number of refugees shall be absorbed into Jordan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National State/ “State of all its Citizens”</td>
<td>Right of return of the Palestinian refugees to the bi-national state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton System</td>
<td>The Arab states which were involved in the creation of the refugee problem – Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq - hold the responsibility for the its settlement. In order to ease the population pressure in the Gaza strip, Egypt should allow Palestinians to settle in the area of Rafah and north-Sinai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Exchange of Population and Territory” (Lieberman)</td>
<td>The international Community will act to dismantle the refugee camps and to re-settle the refugees in their present host countries. Palestinian refugees will return only to the area of the Palestinian Authority according to its economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel -Palestine-Egypt Swap</td>
<td>No reference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Territory and Population – Demographic Forecast

(Population numbers in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>WB &amp; Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>Israel: 20,700</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,922; GS: 378 Total: 6,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>Israel: 20,700</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,880 GS: 420 Total: 6,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Voice</td>
<td>Israel: 20,700</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,922 GS: 378 Total: 6,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Concept</td>
<td>Israel: 20,800</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,822 GS: 378 Total: 6,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barak Plan</td>
<td>Israel: 20,790</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,810 GS: 400 Total: 6,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab League Plan</td>
<td>Israel: 20,700</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WB: 5,922 GS: 378 Total: 6,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Path to Peace</td>
<td>Israel: 27,000</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Elon)</td>
<td>Jordan-Palestine: 89,206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National state</td>
<td>Israel-Palestine: 27,000</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1 (Israel, WB and Gaza)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine Swap</td>
<td>Israel: 21,700</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Israel Beiteinu)</td>
<td>WB: 4,922 GS: 378 Total: 5,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine - Egypt Swap</td>
<td>Israel: 20,800</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Israel Beiteinu)</td>
<td>WB: 5,600 GS: 1000 Total: 6,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Comments

1. **Territory** – Israel Area not including the Golan.
3. **Annual growth rates of population**: Jews in Israel: 1.4; Druze in Israel: 2.3; Palestinians in Israel: 3.1; Palestinians in Jerusalem: 3.1; Palestinians in the West Bank: 3.2; Palestinians in the Gaza Strip: 4; Palestinians in Jordan: 2.67. Average growth rate of Palestinian Refugees entering Israel or Palestine: 3.5. Assuming steady population growth rates (though improved living standards may lower the rates).
5. **The Geneva initiative**, the **Presidential Concept** and the **Barak Plan** – all Palestinians may fulfill their Right of Return into Palestine. Estimation regarding the number of Palestinians who will choose to exercise this right: low estimation – 500,000 in five years (100,000 in each year 2005-2009); High estimation – 1,000,000 in five years (200,000 in each year 2005-2009). A symbolic Right of Return to Israel – 50,000 over three years (2005+2006 – 17,000 each year, 2007 – 16,000). **Peoples Voice** – same numbers for return to Palestine, no return to the State of Israel. **The Arab Peace Plan** and **Bi-National state** – Right of Return to both Israel and Palestine is not limited. Estimates as in (7) above (Geneva) but without differentiation between Palestine and Israel. **Arab peace plan** – Druze in the Golan under Syrian sovereignty. Jews in Israeli territory.
6. **Benny Elon plan**: Assuming transfer of around 676,000 residents from the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza strip to Jordan.
Documents
Interim Plans
The Road Map

The Road Map is a performance-based and goal-driven plan, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005. The Road Map is the official policy of the US and the Quartet regarding the solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was developed following President Bush’s speech on the Arab-Israeli crisis on April 4, 2002. The "Quartet" (U.S., E.U. Russia and U.N.) was formed with the purpose of organizing a Middle East conference later in the summer. On September 17th 2002, the Quartet issued a statement below regarding a road map for peace that has since undergone several revisions. The official text of the latest version of the roadmap was officially published on May 1, 2003.

Phase I: Ending Terror and Violence
1. Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire to end armed activity and all acts of violence and incitement.
2. Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence and incitement.

Security
3. Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
4. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services.
5. Implementation of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
6. As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian institution-building
7. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress.
Settlements

Phase II –June-December 2003: Transition
9. The second phase is a way station to a permanent status settlement. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
10. Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed.
11. International conference will be convened by the Quartet, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.
12. Arab states restore pre-Intifadah links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
13. Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – 2004-2005
14. Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties.
15. Phase III objectives are: Consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions; sustained, effective Palestinian security performance;
16. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005. Second International Conference will be convened by Quartet, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
17. Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
18. Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
Interim Plans

Unilateral Disengagement

The plan for Unilateral Disengagement was presented by PM Ariel Sharon at the December 2003 Herzliya Conference. The plan as approved by the Cabinet on 6 June 2004 was approved by Knesset (26 October 2004) and is the current official policy of the government of Israel. The disengagement is to be completed by the end of 2005.

Cabinet resolution of 06 June 2004; Addendum A – Revised Disengagement Plan – Main Principles

The process:

1. The required preparatory work for the implementation of the plan will be carried out (including staff work to determine criteria, definitions, evaluations, and preparations for required legislation). Immediately upon completion of the preparatory work, a discussion will be held by the Government in order to make a decision concerning the relocation of settlements, taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at that time – whether or not to relocate, and which settlements. The towns and villages will be classified into four groups, as follows: Group A – Morag, Netzarim, Kfar Darom; Group B – the villages of Northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh); Group C – the towns and villages of Gush Katif; Group D – the villages of the Northern Gaza Strip (Elei Sinai, Dugit and Nissanhut). It is clarified that, following the completion of the aforementioned preparations, the Government will convene periodically in order to decide separately on the question of whether or not to relocate, with respect to each of the aforementioned groups. The continuation of the aforementioned process is subject to the resolutions that the Government will pass, as mentioned above in Article 2, and will be implemented in accordance with the content of those resolutions.

2. The Gaza Strip - The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. This will not include military deployment in the area of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("the Philadelphi Route") as detailed below. Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated.

3. The West Bank - The State of Israel will evacuate an area in Northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh), and all military installations in this area, and will redeploy outside the vacated area. Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces in this area. The move will enable territorial contiguity for Palestinians in the Northern Samaria area. The State of Israel will assist, together with the international community, in improving the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank in order to facilitate the contiguity of Palestinian transportation. The process will facilitate normal life and Palestinian economic and commercial activity in the West Bank. The intention is to complete the planned relocation process by the end of 2005.

4. The Security Fence - The State of Israel will continue building the Security Fence, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Government. The route will take into account humanitarian considerations.
Security Situation Following the Relocation

5. **The Gaza Strip:** The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip shall be demilitarized and shall be devoid of weaponry, the presence of which does not accord with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip.

6. **The West Bank:** Upon completion of the evacuation of the Northern Samaria area, no permanent Israeli military presence will remain in this area. The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Northern Samaria area. In other areas of the West Bank, current security activity will continue. However, as circumstances require, the State of Israel will consider reducing such activity in Palestinian cities. The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of internal checkpoints throughout the West Bank.

7. **Military Installations and Infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria:** In general, these will be dismantled and evacuated, with the exception of those which the State of Israel decides to transfer to another party.

8. **Security Assistance to the Palestinians:** The State of Israel agrees that by coordination with it, advice, assistance and training will be provided to the Palestinian security forces for the implementation of their obligations to combat terrorism and maintain public order, by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as agreed therewith.

9. **No foreign security presence** may enter the Gaza Strip and/or the West Bank without being coordinated with and approved by the State of Israel.

10. **The Border Area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route):** The State of Israel will continue to maintain a military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route). This presence is an essential security requirement. At certain locations, security considerations may require some widening of the area in which the military activity is conducted. Subsequently, the evacuation of this area will be considered. Evacuation of the area will be dependent, inter alia, on the security situation and the extent of cooperation with Egypt in establishing a reliable alternative arrangement. If and when conditions permit the evacuation of this area, the State of Israel will be willing to consider the possibility of the establishment of a seaport and airport in the Gaza Strip, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with Israel.

11. **Real Estate Assets:** In general, residential dwellings and sensitive structures, including synagogues, will not remain. The State of Israel will aspire to transfer other facilities, including industrial, commercial and agricultural ones, to a third, international party which will put them to use for the benefit of the Palestinian population that is not involved in terror. The area of the Erez industrial zone will be transferred to the responsibility of an agreed upon Palestinian or international party. The State of Israel will explore, together with Egypt, the possibility of establishing a joint industrial zone on the border of the Gaza Strip, Egypt and Israel.

12. **Civil Infrastructure and Arrangements:** Infrastructure relating to water, electricity, sewage and telecommunications will remain in place. In general,
Interim Plans

Israel will continue, for full price, to supply electricity, water, gas and petrol to the Palestinians, in accordance with current arrangements. Other existing arrangements, such as those relating to water and the electro-magnetic sphere shall remain in force.

13. **Activity of Civilian International Organizations:** The State of Israel recognizes the great importance of the continued activity of international humanitarian organizations and others engaged in civil development, assisting the Palestinian population. The State of Israel will coordinate with these organizations arrangements to facilitate their activities. The State of Israel proposes that an international apparatus be established (along the lines of the AHLC), with the agreement of Israel and international elements which will work to develop the Palestinian economy.

**Economic Arrangements**

14. In general, the economic arrangements currently in operation between the State of Israel and the Palestinians shall remain in force. These arrangements include, inter alia: The entry and exit of goods between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the State of Israel and abroad; The monetary regime; Tax and customs envelope arrangements; Postal and telecommunications arrangements. The entry of workers into Israel, in accordance with the existing criteria. In the longer term, and in line with Israel’s interest in encouraging greater Palestinian economic independence, the State of Israel expects to reduce the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel, to the point that it ceases completely. The State of Israel supports the development of sources of employment in the Gaza Strip and in Palestinian areas of the West Bank, by international elements.

15. **International Passages:** The International Passage between the Gaza Strip and Egypt: The existing arrangements shall continue. The State of Israel is interested in moving the passage to the "three borders" area, south of its current location. This would need to be effected in coordination with the Government of Egypt. This move would enable the hours of operation of the passage to be extended. The International Passages Between the West Bank and Jordan: The existing arrangements shall continue.

16. **Erez Crossing Point:** The Erez crossing point will be moved to a location within Israel in a time frame to be determined separately by the Government.

17. **Conclusion:** The goal is that implementation of the plan will lead to improving the situation and breaking the current deadlock. If and when there is evidence from the Palestinian side of its willingness, capability and implementation in practice of the fight against terrorism, full cessation of terrorism and violence and the institution of reform as required by the Road Map, it will be possible to return to the track of negotiation and dialogue.

For the full plan:
For illustrative map – see map no. 1.
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

Hoplev ve-ha-nekhamot ha-mivtakot - ha-shalosh ha-mos. 1996 shel ha-me'amaleh ha-miyom.

06.06.2004

Page dimensions: 595.0x842.0

1. The decision was made on the modified withdrawal plan (the withdrawal plan with modifications) by the government on June 6, 2004. The plan was approved by the government on December 2003.

2. The modified withdrawal plan was approved by the government on June 6, 2004. The plan was approved by the Knesset on October 26, 2004. The government announced the withdrawal plan on May 26, 2004.

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9. The modified withdrawal plan was approved by the government on June 6, 2004. The plan was approved by the Knesset on October 26, 2004. The government announced the withdrawal plan on May 26, 2004.
10. **Interim Plans**

11. "A zone along the border between the Strip and Egypt, and the State of Israel will continue to maintain a presence—"Field Force"—of military presence along the border between the Strip and Egypt. It may be necessary to expand the physical space where this will take place, in some places. The Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel will examine the possibility of the withdrawal of this area, in the event that cooperation with Egypt to create a safe environment in the security situation, the State of Israel will be ready to consider the possibility of establishing, under the conditions that will apply, a commercial port and an airport in the Strip.

12. **Sanitary and Civil Administration**

13. "The water and sanitation systems, the power, the water networks—on the condition, gas and fuel to the Palestinians, water, electric power, in full payment. Israel will continue. The remains of the buildings of the residents and sensitive buildings, including commercial ones, will be transferred to the State of Israel.

14. "Israel is not prepared, in principle, for the movement of people and goods today between the Strip and the State. For the purposes of the economic agreement, the existing arrangements will be maintained.

15. "The international organizations and others working in the humanitarian sector will be adjusted with the international organizations. For example, a mechanism will be established to support the Palestinian population, with the aid of Israel and international organizations, to set up an economic zone. The State of Israel will examine, in agreement with Egypt and Israel, a joint border crossing.

16. **Summary**

17. "If the goal is that the implementation of the plan will lead to an improvement in the situation and end the current blockade, the ability and implementation of the fight against terrorism, and when there are indications from the Palestinian side that they will support this decision, full cessation of terrorism and violence will be carried out. The International Road Map and the cultural exchange are being carried out.

http://www.pmo.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/AFB8AC38-9B35-446E-AB96-09B34540CE56/0/25102510.rtf
An Alternative Disengagement – The “Zionist Separation Route”

The plan, written by an Arye Haskin, an Israeli settler in the territories, stems from the belief that the building of a separation fence is already a fact that cannot be changed, and therefore the struggle should be focused on influencing its route – creating a fence that would leave in the Israeli side the majority of the settlements, settlers and strategic space.

**Key principals:**

1. **Settlement blocks, security zones and the areas vital to the existence of Israel will be annexed by the state of Israel.** They would enjoy an equal position, in all spheres, to that of the other areas of the country. The settlements that are already under Israeli sovereignty will become an integral part of the sovereign state of Israel, (biger: and a law will bind status of special interest. 

2. Israel shall deploy behind a **separation line** that will be based on a physical obstacle, leaving outside Israeli sovereignty areas of the historical "Eretz Israel" that contain blocks of Palestinian settlers. The separation lines will facilitate a connection between areas populated with Palestinians, in a way that would enable the creation, in its time, of a Palestinian state.

3. The settlement of the separation lines or the final border will be combined with an unequivocally policy statement clearing to the Palestinians there would be a territorial price for any aggressive behavior on their part.

4. **Separation fence route** – the proposed fence has two sides – inside and outside. The exterior fence is an eastern fence, which will complete the route of the fence that is now being built in the west, north and south.

5. **The eastern fence** will put under Israeli control the Jordan valley with the mountain ridge settlements such as Eli, Ofra, Shilo and Elon More. It will continue to the south, to include the Judea Desert and the northern Dead Sea, along with the southern mount Hebron, Kiryat-Arba and the settlements of the Eastern Gush-Etzion. There are several plans that propose a route for the eastern fence. For example, the plan for road 80 connecting Arad with the Elon road, which provides a transportation solution, in case the fence separates the eastern parts of Judea and Samaria from the western parts.

6. Within the separation lines, to be decided upon, the area of Israel will include the entire landscape of the expanded eastern backbone: the Jordan Valley, the Judea Desert and the settlements that are territorially connected to them, areas that do not have a Palestinian-dominated-demographic composition. This policy will also apply to the western backbone, to which the settlement blocks territorially connected to the coastal area will be attached.

7. **Settlements and population** – around 15 Jewish settlements, in which around 7,000 settlers reside, will not be included in the Israeli area. On the other hand, the fence route necessitates the annexation of around 75,000 Arabs, residing in its interior, to Israel.

Source: Yedioth Ahronot, 13 January 2004:
[http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2858507,00.html](http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2858507,00.html)
Unpublished document.
Interim Plans

International or Regional Trusteeship
This model is a short-range arrangement intended to bring the Palestinians to a desired level of self-rule after which it may exercise its right of self-determination. The trusteeship model is popular in the international community as a tool for conflict resolution and has been successfully implemented in various conflicts in the world. Variants of the trusteeship model (according to the identity of the trustee) have been proposed by Ambassador Marin Indyk, Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami, who propose the international trusteeship model and Palestinian academics, who have informally proposed a Jordanian trusteeship. The following are the key points which characterize these plans:

1. A trusteeship could be built along the lines of the NATO/OSCE involvement in the Balkans or along the lines the mandate regimes in pre-WWII terms. The trusteeship would have an explicit mandate to build an independent, democratic Palestinian state. It would take formal control of Palestinian territories from the Palestinian Authority and hold them in trust for the Palestinian people.

2. The source of legitimacy of the trusteeship could be a UN resolution supported by a resolution of an Arab Summit and side letters from the Palestinian Authority and Israel. In the “Jordanian” variant of this model, a declaration of a temporary Jordanian-Palestinian confederation would provide the legitimacy for a de facto Jordanian trusteeship. This may include a joint Jordanian-Palestinian parliament (along the lines of the European Parliament), and a plan for Palestinian nation building over a period which includes developing the Palestinian security apparatus.

3. Territory – The trusteeship could be established in:
   A. Territories that already ceded by Israel to the Palestinians (the "A and B areas" of the Oslo accords), possibly with some additional land from the "C areas" that have remained under Israeli control included to provide territorial contiguity.
   B. The area from which Israel withdraws in the context of the unilateral withdrawal.
   C. The area east of the separation fence (with certain exceptions of settlements which remain outside of the fence).

4. Security – The trusteeship authority would have at its disposal a military force of up to 10,000 men. They would be tasked with maintaining order, suppressing terrorism, and restructuring and retraining the Palestinian security services. This force could be comprised (according to various proposals) of:
   A. U.S.-commanded Special Forces units augmented by forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada and backed up by additional "over the horizon" international forces stationed nearby in Jordan, Egypt, and Israel.
   B. Jordanian and Egyptian participation in training the restructured Palestinian security services.
   C. Jordanian military presence (Jordanian Palestine Liberation Army units) in lieu of the Palestinian security organizations.

5. Governance – The trusteeship would oversee the establishment by Palestinians of democratic political institutions, and (with the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), would supervise the establishment of transparent and accountable economic institutions. As the process of democratic nation-building progressed, the trustees would gradually devolve authority to the
Palestinian institutions. The mechanism for establishing the trusteeship would thus have to include the following elements:

A. A structure for **Palestinian democratic institutions**, including a Palestinian consultative body, to represent the Palestinian people to the trusteeship in the transitional period before a constitution is finalized and elections are held. The **Palestinian Legislative Council** could serve this purpose. In the Jordanian variant of this proposal a Palestinian parliament and government would be elected as well as a joint parliament for both Jordan and Palestine.

B. **A time line for statehood.** The trusteeship should establish a **three-year time line** for carrying out the final-status negotiations and establishing a Palestinian state. The trusteeship should have to be authorized to remain in force until it became possible to hand over complete authority and sovereignty to a democratically elected, Palestinian government able to live up to its commitments, including in the areas of security and prevention of terrorism.

C. **Procedures for judging Palestinian performance.** The trustees would be responsible for judging Palestinian fulfillment of their commitments.

6. **Economic Reconstruction** through international funding for an effort akin to the Marshall Plan to rebuild the Palestinian economy.

7. **Final Status Negotiations** – Parallel to the establishment of the trusteeship, final-status negotiations would be launched between Israeli and Palestinian delegations to resolve, among other issues, the final borders of the Palestinian state. In the Jordanian variant, a **negotiating mechanism** would be based on Jordanian involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process along the lines of the “Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation” which negotiated with Israel in and after the Madrid Conference or a pre-negotiation agreement on the future creation of a joint entity along the lines of the Hussein–Arafat Accord of 11 February 1985, which stipulated that the “inalienable right of self-determination” of the Palestinian people will be exercised “when Jordanians and Palestinians will be able to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederal states of Jordan and Palestine”.

8. **Refugees** – Once the final-status negotiators achieved agreement on the Palestinian refugee issue, meanwhile, the trusteeship could begin the process of absorbing those refugees who chose to be resettled there, even before the emergence of a fully independent Palestinian state.

There is no territorial map associated with this plan. The relevant map is the Oslo Map of areas A, B, and C (see map no. 20).

Martin Indyk’s plan according to: *Foreign Affairs*, 12 May 2003. In: [http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1592](http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1592)
The Jordanian variant according to an unpublished Palestinian document
“Two States” Plans
The People's Voice

Statement of Principles

The “Peoples Voice” is an initiative signed by Gen (res.) Ami Ayalon and Prof. Sari Nusseibeh on July 27, 2002. It is based on “two states for two peoples”, mutual recognition and mutual relinquishing of claims over the territory of the other (including the right of settlement and the right of return).

1. Two states for two peoples: Both sides will declare that Palestine is the only state of the Palestinian people and Israel is the only state of the Jewish people.

2. Borders: Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon on the basis of the June 4, 1967 lines, UN resolutions, and the Arab peace initiative (known as the Saudi initiative).
   • Border modifications will be based on an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial contiguity, and demographic considerations.
   • The Palestinian State will have a connection between its two geographic areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   • After establishment of the agreed borders, no settlers will remain in the Palestinian State.

3. Jerusalem: Jerusalem will be an open city, the capital of two states. Freedom of religion and full access to holy sites will be guaranteed to all.
   • Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty.
   • Neither side will exercise sovereignty over the holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram a-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be the Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy site will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent.

4. Right of return: Recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees, the international community, Israel, and the Palestinian State will initiate and contribute to an international fund to compensate them.
   • Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will return only to the State of Israel.
   • The international community will offer to compensate toward bettering the lot of those refugees willing to remain in their present country of residence, or who wish to immigrate to third-party countries.

5. The Palestinian State will be demilitarized and the international community will guarantee its security and independence.

6. End of conflict: Upon the full implementation of these principles, all claims on both sides and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end.

The “Peoples Voice” does not present a map.

"Two States" Plans

המפת הלאומית

המצד הלגאלמי

1. **End of the Conflict**: The implementation of this Agreement will settle all of the claims of the Parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. Neither party may raise further claims related to events prior to this Agreement
2. **Mutual Recognition**: The agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties' respective citizens. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.

3. **Borders**: The border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis. Approximately 97.5% of the West Bank and 100% of Gaza will become part of Palestine, in exchange for 2 areas of comparable size within Israel: one area near Gaza to widen the Gaza Strip by 90 square kilometers, and another area adjacent to the southern West Bank.

4. **Settlements** – Israel will absorb settlement blocs that contain 110,000 settlers, in addition to the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, which include 200,000 Israelis. 110,000 Israelis living in 120 out of 140 West Bank settlements, and all settlements in the Gaza Strip, will be evacuated. No Palestinians are annexed to Israel.

5. **Border regime and safe passage** – The states of Palestine and Israel will establish a permanent open corridor, linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip according to detailed arrangements that appear in the Accord. It will traverse Israeli territory, and will be under Palestinian administration and under Israeli sovereignty. Movement across the border will only be at designated points and each side will be responsible for the border regime to implement this on its own side. Both parties will recognize these borders as the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between Israel and Palestine.

6. **Designated Road Arrangements**: There are special arrangements, including MF patrols, for Israeli civilian use of designated roads within Palestinian sovereign territory, (443, Jerusalem-Tiberius, Jerusalem–Ein Gedi).

7. **Implementation & Security**: An International Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) - including the US, Russia, the EU, the UN and others - and a Multinational Force (MF) in Palestine will be established to provide security guarantees to both parties, act as a deterrent, and to help insure implementation and to monitor compliance by both parties to the terms of the agreement. Joint teams composed of members of the Palestinian Security Force (PSF) and the MF will monitor all border crossings of Palestine. Israel will be able to maintain an unseen presence at a designated facility in passenger and cargo terminals.

8. Palestine shall be a **non-militarized state**, with a strong security force. The MF will protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine and oversee the relevant clauses of the Agreement. The MF will help enforce anti-terrorism measures, monitor Palestinian security compliance, and train the PSF.

9. **Disbanding terrorist infrastructure** – Existing irregular forces and armed groups shall be disbanded and prevented from reforming at any future date. A Trilateral Security Committee - including Israel, Palestine, and the US - shall develop comprehensive policies and guidelines to fight terrorism and violence. Israel and Palestine will promulgate laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence and vigorously enforce them.

10. **Withdrawal** – Israeli military forces and settlers will be removed from Palestinian territory within 30 months. Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF for an additional
“Two States” Plans

36 months. Israel may maintain two Early Warning Stations (EWS) in the northern and central West Bank.

11. Sovereignty – The Palestinian state will enjoy sovereignty and security control over all roads in its territory and over its own airspace. The Israeli Air Force will be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training.

12. Alliances – No side can assist, promote, or join a hostile military alliance or coalition against the other.

13. Jerusalem: Israel and Palestine shall have their mutually recognized capitals in areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty. Israel will receive sovereignty over the “Western Wall”, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, including Givat Ze'ev, Ma'aleh Adumim, and the original historically Jewish area of Gush Etzion. Israel shall administer the Tower of David, the Western Wall tunnel, and the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Palestine will receive sovereignty over al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (the "Compound"), the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian Quarters of the Old City, and the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. An International Group, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of the terms of the agreement regarding the Compound. The Compound will be open to people of all faiths, with the Multinational Force ensuring freedom of access to the site. No digging, excavation, or construction can take place on the Compound without mutual consent, and the Palestinians recognize the unique cultural and religious significance of the site to Jewish people. The two Jerusalem municipalities shall coordinate. Palestinian who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside.

14. Other Sites of Religious Significance: Israel and Palestine shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, which will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs, Rachel's Tomb, and Nabi Samuel.

15. Repatriation/settlement of Palestinian Refugees: The Refugee problem will be solved through 2 independent states – Israel and Palestine – living side by side in peace and on the basis of UNGA Resolution 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative. All Palestinian refugees shall be entitled to compensation. Refugees will be given the choice to (1) move to the new Palestinian state, including areas formerly in Israel, (2) remain in the countries where they currently reside or move to a third country, (3) move to a third country, or (4) move to Israel. Option (1) is the right of all Palestinians and in unlimited numbers; options (2)–(4) are in numbers according to the discretion of those countries. A Palestinian refugees choice shall be free and informed – not subject to interference or organized pressure and in the context of Palestinian self-determination being recognized in the new Palestine. Clauses include an end to claims, end of refugee status and phasing out of UNRWA within 5 years.

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

1. Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans: In the context of the peace negotiations, Israel and the Palestinian Authority have been engaged in discussions to reach an agreement on a two-state solution for the region. One of the key elements of this agreement is to establish a Palestinian state that will have its own government and a constitution.

2. The main issues include: sec. 1: The end of the conflict. Implementation of the agreement will settle all claims of the parties based on events that occurred before. Parties will not raise any claims related to events that take place after the signing of this agreement.

3. Mutual recognition. This agreement acknowledges the right of the Palestinian state to exist in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

4. Borders and settlements: the border between the Palestinian state and Israel will be based on the 1967 armistice line. In addition, territories of the occupied Palestinian territories that are not included in the Palestinian state will be returned to the Palestinian state.

5. Peacekeeping and border control: the authority of the Palestinian state will be responsible for controlling the borders and ensuring the safety of the people. The Italian and French missions will be in charge of implementing this agreement.

6. Security cooperation: a joint security mechanism will be established to maintain security and stability in the region.

7. Diplomacy: the parties will work towards establishing a diplomatic relationship between the two states.

8. International cooperation: the international community will support the implementation of the peace agreement.

9. Implementation: the agreement will be implemented in stages, with the first phase being the establishment of the Palestinian state.

10. Conclusion: the parties have agreed to work towards a lasting peace in the region, based on the principles of the two-state solution.
Two States” Plans

... shaded light and dark red, with a major change in the eastern part of Jerusalem, including Mount Zion, part of which was to be under Palestinian rule, including the tomb of Rachel, and the main entrance to the Temple Mount. Israel would manage the Temple Mount, as well as the Jewish Quarter. The Mosque of Omar would be under Jordanian rule, with Israel maintaining the Moslem Quarter. The Palestinian side would receive sovereignty over the area of Gush Etzion and the Muslim Quarter of East Jerusalem, and the Christian and Armenian neighborhoods in the Old City would be involved in the negotiations. The agreement provided for the formation of a joint committee to monitor the implementation of the agreement, including representatives from the Islamic Council for the area.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority would establish special arrangements to ensure access to religious sites, including the Tomb of the Patriarchs, and the tombs of Samuel, Rachel, and David. The solution for Palestinian refugees would be in the context of two states – Israel and the Palestinian state, with the resolution of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 194, and Council Resolution 242. The Palestinians claim all Palestinian refugees are entitled to compensation. The Palestinian side presented the basis for the refugee issue: (1) for refugees, the option of staying in the state they are living in today, or (2) moving to a third state, or (3) moving to Israel. The decision of the Palestinian refugees regarding their permanent settlement would be free and informed, and would be in the context of a self-determination that is not subject to interference or organized pressure. The conclusion of all the claims of the Palestinians in the new state within five years would be a phased implementation of the agreement.

To view the full text: http://www.heskem.org.il/haheskem.asp
US Presidential Concept

The following list of principles reflects the current US position on the final settlement. It is an abridged version of the text read by President Clinton to the Israeli and Palestinian delegates, December 23, 2000 and President George W. Bush’s letter to PM Ariel Sharon on 19 April 2004. The latter are marked in bold italics. Clinton clarified while presenting his plan that it would no longer be valid after he leaves office.

**Territory**

1. The basis for the process must be the Road Map.
2. The agreement should clearly mark the **end of the conflict** and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Counsel Resolution that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners.
3. Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.
4. The Palestinian State should be viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent. The **US supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent.**
5. The Palestinian State should include somewhere between 94 and 96 percent of the West Bank territory with a land swap of 1 to 3 percent and other territorial arrangements to compensate for the land Israel annexes for its settlement blocs. Criteria for drawing up maps are: 80 percent of the settlers in blocs, contiguity of territory for each side, minimizing annexation and the number of Palestinians affected. Territorial arrangements should include permanent safe passage swaps of leased land.
6. **In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949...** Any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

**Refugees**

7. A solution to the Palestinian refugee issue will need to be found by the settling of Palestinian refugees in the new Palestinian State there, rather than in Israel. Return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and areas acquired in the land swap would be the right of all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries. The parties would agree that this implements resolution 194. **It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.**

**Security**

8. The United States remains committed to Israel’s: security and well-being as a Jewish state; right to secure, defensible borders, capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats; right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations.
“Two States” Plans

9. Palestinians must: cease armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere; end incitement against Israel; implement sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure;

10. A settlement may include an international presence that can only be withdrawn by agreement of both sides. Israeli withdrawal should be phased while the international force is gradually introduced into that area. At the end of this period, a small Israeli presence in fixed locations may remain in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel. After Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue. Israel may maintain 3 early warning facilities on the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The station would be subject to review after three years with any change in their status to be mutually agreed.

11. Emergency deployments – maps of relevant areas and routes should be worked out. Definition of “emergency” could be based on a formulation that refers to “an imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security that requires Israel to declare a national state of emergency. The international forces would have to be notified of any such determination.

12. The state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

13. Palestine should be defined as a "non-militarized state."

Jerusalem

14. The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. Maps should achieve maximum contiguity for both sides within this framework. This principle would also apply to the Haram/Temple Mount – i.e. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram, and Israeli sovereignty over “the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part”, with a need for mutual consent before any excavation takes place in these areas.

Palestinian Governance

15. The Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.

16. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

See map no. 3.


The Camp David Offer (The Barak Plan) – Main Ideas

The proposal submitted by PM Ehud Barak at the Camp David Summit in September 2000 was expressly intended to be valid only for the period of the negotiations, and to be withdrawn at the end of the summit. The elements of the proposal were also presented as a “package deal” on the basis of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Nevertheless, the proposal served as the basis for the continuing negotiations at Taba and is widely seen by the Palestinians as a point of departure for future negotiations.

The following are the key elements of the proposal according to published sources. The elements described below have not been authorized by the author of the plan (former PM Barak) or by anyone who participated in the talks.

1. **Mutual recognition** – the State of Israel and the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people: mutually recognize each other’s right to exist in peace and security – each on its own land, inside **secure and recognized borders, free of threats or acts of violence**. The relations between Israel and Palestine will be based on peaceful co-existence. The two sides re-affirm that the Palestinian People has the right of self-determination according to international law.

2. **End of Conflict** – the framework agreement on the final status marks the end of the conflict between the two sides.

3. **Terror and Incitement** – Israel and Palestine will create an atmosphere for peace and lasting reconciliation by legislation to put **an end to incitement, terror and violence** and enforcing such laws through suitable educational programs in each one’s schools.

4. **Alliances** – Israel and Palestine will **refrain from any military, political or economic alliance or confederation with third parties** whose interests contradict those of the other party to the agreement without prior consultation and agreement with the other party.

5. **Borders, settlements and territorial arrangements** (according to the Moratinos document) – WB – settlement blocs and the area of Latrun – approximately 80 percent of the settlers and 6 percent of the WB – will be annexed to Israel in return for an area of the size of 3 percent of the WB that Israel will transfer to Palestine. An additional 2 percent of the WB will be leased to Israel on a permanent basis. The Gaza Strip will be completely under Palestinian sovereignty and the settlements will be evacuated. The “safe passage” and other Palestinian assets will be counted as part of the area which will be given to Palestine in return for the annexation of parts of the WB.

6. **Border Control and free passage** – Corridors for joint use will be set up in Israeli and Palestinian territories for local movement of people, vehicles and goods. A safe passage will be set up between the WB and Gaza.

7. **Jerusalem and the Holy Places** – both sides recognize the universal significance of Jerusalem and its sanctity for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The “Holy Basin” of Jerusalem – the Old City and the adjacent religious and historic sites – will be placed under a special regime. The Zone of Jerusalem (ZOJ) – the area inside the municipal borders of Jerusalem and adjacent populated Israeli and Palestinian areas, comprising of areas under Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty and areas regarding which the sovereignty has yet to be determined – will be managed as one integral functional economic and environmental unit and will include the recognized capitals of Israel and Palestine – Jerusalem and al-Quds.
“Two States” Plans

The two sides will guarantee freedom of movement within the zone of Jerusalem. The two sides are committed to freedom of worship in the holy places and freedom of access to those places. The Temple Mount/ Haram a-Sharif and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron are under divine supervision and are holy Jews and Muslims alike. They will be remain under the jurisdiction of the religious communities which have until now been responsible for them. The Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif will be under Palestinian jurisdiction (except for the Jewish holy site) and Israeli sovereignty. An agreed site on the Temple Mount will be allocated for Jewish worship. The historic character and the archeological artifacts of the temple Mount will be preserved.

8. Security – the de-militarized Palestinian State will maintain a Police and domestic security force with land and sea elements for domestic security, law-enforcement and counter-terrorism. Israel, for defense of its vital interests, will maintain a presence of a land force and early warning installations in area which will be decided upon. In case of an imminent threat, Israel may, with prior notice to Palestine, to temporarily increase its forces in certain areas for the period of said threat. Though Israel and Palestine recognize each other’s sovereignty over their air space and electro–magnetic spectrum, due to the fact that the air space and electro–magnetic spectrum of the two countries are practically indivisible, and out of deference to Israel’s defense interests, the two sides will agree that the air space will remain under Israeli administration.

9. Refugees – A solution to the refugee problem in all its aspects will be achieved through an international effort, including Israel. The solution will include: return to the State of Palestine; integration in host countries; and emigration to third countries. The right of return of the Palestinian refugees will be valid only in the state of Palestine and Israel recognizes that right. On a humanitarian basis and in accordance with Israel’s own sovereign discretion, Israel may allow a certain number of refugees to enter its territory. An international fund will allocate the resources for refugee re-settlement and rehabilitation. Re-settlement of refugees in the present host countries or in third countries will be done through comprehensive programs for development and rehabilitation. The sides agree that a just solution of the Israeli–Arab conflict must also settle the claims by individual Jews and Jewish communities that left Arab counties or parts of the Palestine mandate area in the wake of the 1948 war.

10. Economic Relations – Both counties will attempt to guarantee the freedom of movement of individuals, vehicles, goods and services between them. Israel and Palestine will form an Israeli–Palestinian Free Trade Zone to manage their trade relations. Each side will accord citizens of the other side access to its labor markets, without prejudice in regard to third parties. Each side has absolute discretion to limit the number of workers from the other country who may enter.

Sources:
Akiva Eldar. ""Moratinos Document" – the peace that nearly was at Taba". Ha'aretz, February 14, 2002.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard – a Voyage to the Boundaries of the Peace Process, Tel Aviv: 2004
See map no. 4
The Arab League Plan
(Official translation – see comments, see map no. 5)

The Council of Arab States at the Summit Level at its 14th Ordinary Session, reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government.

Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which his highness presented his initiative calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:

1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:
   I- Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.
   II- Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
   III- The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:
   I- Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.
   II- Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability and prosperity.
6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative.
7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim states and the European Union.

1 The Arabic version reads: “It is demanded to implement the following”
2 The Arabic version reads “Then the Arab States will implement the following”
مبادئ السلام العربية

مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة المنعقد في دورته العادية الرابعة عشر.
- يؤكّد بأنه أمر مؤتمر القمة العربي غير العادي في القاهرة في يونيو 1996 من أن السلام العادل والشامل خيار استراتيجي للدول العربية يتحقق في ظل الشرعية الدولية، ويستوجب التزاماً مقابله توّكده.

ويعود أن استمع إلى كلمة صاحب السمو الملكي الأمير عبد الله بن عبد العزيز، ولي عهد المملكة العربية السعودية، التي أعلن من خلالها مبادئه داعياً إلى إشراقب إسرائيل الكامل من جميع الأراضي العربية المتصلة منذ 1967، تتفقّد لقرار مجلس الأمن (242 و 338) والذين عززهما قرارات مؤتمر مدريد عام 1991 ومبدأ الائتلاف الفلسطيني مستقلّة ذات سيادة واصتقامها القدس الشرقية، وذلك مقابل قيام الدول العربية بإنشاء علاقات طبيعية في إطار سلام شامل مع إسرائيل.

واتفاقاً من اقتراح الدول العربية بأن الحل العسكري للنزاع لم يحقق السلام أو الأمن لأي من الطرفين.
- يتطلب المجلس من إسرائيل إعادة النظر في سياساتها، وأن تجنب للسلم معظمة أن السلام العادل هو خيارها الاستراتيجي أيضًا.

2- كما يطالبها القيام بما يلي:
- الإ nasıl الكامل من الأراضي العربية المتصلة بما في ذلك الجولان السوري وحتى خط الرابع من يونيو (حزيران) 1967، والأراضي التي مازالت متصلة في جنوب لبنان.
- التوصل إلى حل عادل لمشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين يّقظ عليه وفقاً لقرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم 194.
- قبول قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلّة ذات سيادة على الأراضي الفلسطينية المتصلة منذ الرابع من يونيو 1967 في النصف الغربي وقطاع غزة ويعتبر عاصمتها القدس الشرقية.
- عندئذ تقوم الدول العربية بما يلي:
- اعتبار النزاع العربي الإسرائيلي منتهياً، والدخول في اتفاقية سلام بينها وبين إسرائيل مع تحقيق الأمن للجميع دول المنطقة.
- إنشاء علاقات طبيعية مع إسرائيل في إطار هذا السلام الشامل.
- ضمان رفض كل أشكال التنظيم الفلسطيني الذي ينتفّق وينتج عن الوضع الخاص في البلدان العربية المضيفة.
- يدعو المجلس حكومة إسرائيل والأيضاءن زعماء إلى قبول هذه المبادرة المبينة علامة حمامة لفرص السلام وتوفيق للدول العربية وإسرائيل من العيش في سلام جنبًا إلى جنب، ويوفر للأعمال القادمة مستقبلًا أمام سدوء الرخاء والاستقرار.
- يدعو المجلس المجتمع الدولي بكل دولته ومنظماته إلى دعم هذه المبادرة.
- يطلب المجلس من رئاسته تشكيل لجنة خاصة من عدد من الدول الأعضاء المعنية والإيضاءن العام لإجراء الأتاصات اللازمة بهذا المبادرة والعمل على تأكيد دعمها على كافة المستويات وفي مقامها الأمم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن والولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الروسي والدول الإسلامية والاتحاد الأوروبي.

Source:
The concept of a land swap that which would include areas in Israel populated by Israeli Arabs was initially proposed in academic circles (Prof. Arnon Sofer, Prof. Shlomo Avineri). It had been floated by Israeli political figures from both sides of the political spectrum (former Minister MK Dr. Ephraim Sneh from Labor and in November 2004 by Avigdor Lieberman (“Yisrael Beiteinu” party). The plans differ in a number of points. The Lieberman plan (synopsis below) differs from the academic proposal in that it does not refer directly to the “Palestinian Authority” or a “Palestinian State” but to the Palestinians in general. The Sofer proposal also refers to (1) evacuation of around 30-35 Israeli settlements populated by around 40,000 people that are obstacles to the demarcation of a defendable border and their transfer in an orderly manner to the Palestinian authority; (2) leaving the Jordan Valley under IDF responsibility and the Rafah corridor (Philadelphi Route) under Israeli sovereignty in order to prevent territorial continuity between Palestine and Egypt; (3) Israeli withdrawal from parts of east Jerusalem, leaving the entire old city in Israeli sovereignty, placing around 220,000 Arabs under Palestinian sovereignty; (4) reaching a solution for Muslim access to the Temple Mount without passing through the old city through Silwan or the “Lions Gate”. (see: Arnon Sofer, Israel, Demography 2003-2020, dangers and possibilities). For a conceptual map of this concept (not of the Israel Beiteinu” plan) see map no. 6.

### Plan for Population and Territory Swap

(Plan by Chairman of “Israel Beiteinu” party – Avigdor Lieberman)

**Key Principles**

1. The level of friction can be reduced by a swap of population territory between Israel and the Palestinians. Arab towns and villages (such as Um al–Fahem, Tayibe, Baqa’a al–Gharbiya, Kafar Qassem) in the “Triangle”, villages and suburbs (such as A-Ram, Jabel Mukabar) east of Jerusalem, should remain outside of the borders of the State of Israel. In return, Israel will apply its sovereignty over Jewish population centers in Judaea and Samaria. After the swap of territory and population the borders between Israel and the PA will, for the first time, be an optimal expression of the demographic borders between the two peoples. The plan is applicable without expelling Jews or Arabs from their lands or homes, but rather by moving the border alone. As a result of the swap of lands and population, the number of Muslim Israeli Arabs will be reduced by 450 thousand. It is conceivable that this step will have a deterrent effect on the Muslim Arabs who will remain inside Israel.

2. **Mutual Recognition** – The two sides will declare that Israel is a Jewish Zionist State and that the Palestinian Authority is the Homeland of the Palestinians. The exchange of population and territory will put an end to all claims and both sides will be committed to refrain from future claims.

3. **Security** – The Palestinian Authority will be de-militarized. It will not have the right to form alliances and no foreign military forces may be stationed within its territory.
“Two States” Plans

4. **Jerusalem**, the capital of Israel is indivisible. Only the Arab villages and suburbs near the east of the city will be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty.

5. The swap of population and land must be complemented by an amendment of the Israeli *citizenship law*, which would apply equally to Jews and Arabs without discrimination and provide equal rights and duties to all the citizens of the state. The new law would include:
   
   A. An oath of allegiance – At the time of receiving or replacing an identity card, any person desiring to receive or keep Israeli citizenship will pledge allegiance to the State of Israel and its symbols (the Declaration of Independence, the flag and the national anthem). Any person who refuses to do so will be accorded status of permanent resident but will lose his citizenship and his right to vote or to be elected to public office.
   
   B. Military service – Every citizen will be obligated to military service. Ultra-religious Jews and Muslim Arabs will be obligated to serve in “civil service” (in hospitals, retirement homes, schools, etc.) in their areas. An ultra-religious Jew or Arab Muslim who volunteers for military service will have to receive special permission from the security authorities. Any person who refuses to perform military or civil service will remain in Israel as a resident but will lose his citizenship and his right to vote or to be elected to public office.

6. **Refugees** – The international community will make an effort to dismantle the refugee camps and to settle the refugees in their present host countries. Palestinian refugees will be permitted to return only to the Palestinian Authority according to its economic development.

7. **Involvement of the Arab States** – Israel will demand that practical backing from the neighboring Arab States, especially Egypt and Jordan for the agreement. They will have to take an active part in the improvement of the economic situation of the Palestinian population and in security responsibility for the territories: Egypt in the Gaza Strip and Jordan in Judea and Samaria. If they refuse to cooperate, Israel should use its influence with influential Jewish organizations in the United States to put an end to the aid that they receive from the United States.
1. The peace plan envisages the exchange of territories and populations between Israel and the Palestinian territories. The plan's key points include:

   - The establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This would result in a territorial compromise, with Israel retaining control over Jewish settlements and the East Jerusalem Security Area.

   - The status of Jerusalem would be resolved through direct negotiations, with Israel retaining control over Jewish settlements and the East Jerusalem Security Area.

   - The exchange of territories and populations would be carried out without the displacement of any Israeli or Palestinian citizens.

   - The plan is designed to facilitate a lasting peace, aimed at maintaining a peaceful coexistence between the two peoples.

2. The plan envisions a process of normalization of relations between the two parties, including:

   - The exchange of ambassadors and the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

   - The establishment of direct communications between the two parties.

   - The resolution of outstanding disputes through direct negotiations.

3. The plan envisions the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This would result in a territorial compromise, with Israel retaining control over Jewish settlements and the East Jerusalem Security Area.

4. The plan envisions a process of normalization of relations between the two parties, including:

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7. The plan envisions a process of normalization of relations between the two parties, including:

   - The exchange of ambassadors and the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

   - The establishment of direct communications between the two parties.

   - The resolution of outstanding disputes through direct negotiations.

Source: Unpublished Paper
“One State” Plans

“One State” Plans
De-Zionization of Israel –“Bi-National” State

There is, at present no formal plan on the table for a bi-national Jewish-Palestinian State in the area west of the Jordan River. However, the main principles of such an idea are circulating in political and academic circles. The foremost proponent of this idea is MK Azmi Bishara. These principles include:

1. Maintaining the area west of the Jordan River as one political entity.
2. Possible models may be: (a) the Belgian model, with a single bi-national framework over the entire area; (b) two separate parliaments with an additional “supra–parliament”; (3) two separate democratic political entities with common arrangements in passport control, commercial relations, rights of residence etc.
3. Separation between nationality and citizenship, while defining Israeli nationality in lieu of the present concept of “Jewish” nationality. This implies “de-Zionization” of Israel.
4. Implementation of the Right of Return for the Palestinian refugees, including to the areas within the “green line”.
5. Allowing Israelis in the settlements to continue to reside in the areas, which are predominantly Palestinian.
6. Eventual adoption of common national symbols (flag, anthem).

The “State of all its Citizens” model is basically similar to the “bi-national” model, with the difference that the State would be the democratic result of the nationality of the majority of its citizens. After implementation of the “right of return” such a state would be, in essence, a Palestinian national State with a protected Jewish minority.

For illustrative map of this concept see map no. 7.

For Azmi Bishara's main ideas regarding the Bi-national state see:
http://www.one-state.org/articles/earlier/usher.htm
http://www.one-state.org/articles/1998/bishara2.htm
“One State” Plans

Confederation of Two Non-contiguous States (“Cantonization”)

This paradigm has two main variants: division of the WB into Jewish and Palestinian “Cantons” (the Palestinian cantons being the “Palestinian State”), or dividing the entire area west of the Jordan into two “cantonized” states.

Cantons in WB

The “Cantons Plan” or “Mosaic Sovereignty” has been circulating in academic circles linked to Gush Emunim. This plan has a number of variants according to the basis for defining the Jewish and Palestinian “cantons”: the traditional Ottoman distinction between private domain (“mulk”) lands to remain in Palestinian hands and state domain (“miri”) lands available for Jewish settlement; the Oslo Accord allocation to areas A, B and C. Basic elements of these plans are:

1. The eastern border of Israel will be the Jordan River; Palestine's borders will be the June 4 1967 line.
2. “Mosaic” sovereignty based on cantons in the West Bank and Gaza strip according Palestine rule over the Palestinian-settled territories and Israeli rule over the Jewish-owned territories.
3. Possibility of transfer of Arab settlements in the Israeli "triangle" to Palestine.
4. There will be no transfer of population – either Jews or Palestinian.
5. The roads and the air space in the territories are open to both sides.
6. The cantons-area will be de-militarized of any Palestinian weapons. Israel will hold other "defense lines".
7. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq will support a settlement of the refugee problem.

Cantons in the entire area west of the Jordan

1. The entire area would be divided into six to twelve separate cantons to be united under a common federal government. Each canton would have a Jewish or Arab majority and will be more or less autonomous. Two-thirds would be Jewish and one-third Arab, reflecting the country's overall population balance. The arrangement would be fully federal as in Switzerland where the cantons are the basic units of domestic government. Alternatively, it could be constructed as a decentralized system based on federal principles but still a union, similar to the Netherlands where there are eleven provinces to which the national government delegates most domestic functions according to national standards. Jerusalem would be divided among Jewish/Arab cantons or become a federal district.

2. Examples:
   A. A six-canton arrangement with Jewish cantons in the Galilee, the central coast, the Jewish settled portions of the central interior, and the Negev, and Arab cantons in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.
   B. A nine-canton system, with Jewish cantons in the six existing administrative districts of the Ministry of Interior plus the Golan and Arab cantons in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.
   C. A twelve-canton system, which would establish an Arab canton in central Galilee and eight Jewish cantons, based on population, geography and territorial considerations.

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, Federal/Confederal Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Conflict: Concepts and Feasibility, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/fedconfed-sol.htm
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans

**Israeli-Palestinian Federation/Confederation**

This concept is based on the assumption that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are already inexorably linked to Israel, but at the same time, the nationalism of both peoples does not allow for a unified “One State” solution. The Israeli-Palestinian Federation/Confederation is, therefore, an international entity based on two national entities with common defense and economy policies. Two possible models of this concept are:

A. **Israel-Palestine Federation** – Palestinian constituent state federated with Israel creating bi-state federation establishes a new primary political entity with one general government uniting two constituent or federated states each with its own political institutions plus substantive powers reserved for them and other powers assigned to the federal government. Both states share in the federal government with Jews and Arabs having equal opportunity to reach and hold key federal office. Jerusalem could be a federal district and the seat of federal government. It could also serve as the seat of the individual state governments.

B. **Israel-Palestine Confederation** – The constituent entities remain the primary political units and the general authority has only limited federal delegated powers. Many postmodern confederations are linked through specialized functional authorities rather than a single general authority to assure that where full or substantial powers are transferred in specific areas the transfer does not offer the possibility of extending the powers of the confederal body. An Israel-Palestinian confederation could include two states with permanent boundaries within one general authority or encompassing several joint functional authorities addressing issues common to both states dealing with economic relations and land and water resources. Even foreign affairs or defense could be handled in that way. Each state would design and operate its own political institutions. The establishment of a Palestinian-Arab state would be irrevocable no matter what happens to the confederation. The confederation could resolve symbolic demands and demographic problems since each state would have appropriate forms of symbolic expression -- flag, coinage, stamps, etc. Jerusalem could be the seat of both capitals and of confederative institutions, possibly as separate federal district.

For illustrative map, see map no. 8.

**Source:** Daniel J. Elazar, Federal/Confederal Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Conflict: Concepts and Feasibility, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

[http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/fedconfed-sol.htm](http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/fedconfed-sol.htm)
“Jordanian Options”
Jordan-Palestine/Jordan-Palestine-Israel Federation/Confederation

The Jordan–Palestine Model

The concept of a Federation or Confederation between Jordan and Palestine had been the preferred model for Jordan in the past and was the basis for the Jordanian “United Kingdom” plan of 1972 and the “Hussein–Arafat Accord” of 1985. Today propose it some senior Palestinians. This model has a number of variations:

1. **Federation** – Equality of citizens of both Banks before the federal government with no intermediary or qualification according to their religious or national origin, with a degree of national autonomy and political expression through local governments and locally elected Parliaments. These local authorities would be limited in executive powers to those, which have been constitutionally accorded to them or devolved from the central government. One possible existing model for such a Federation would be the “devolution” models of home rule in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; foreign, defense and security policy would remain in the hands of the central government (i.e. the Hashemite Regime).

2. **Confederation** –This model maintains the basic divisions from which the State has been formed. Authority would lie, therefore, primarily in the constituent States and is delegated to the Confederation. The populations of a Confederation are citizens of their own States and not of the Confederation in general. This option implies a high degree of formal Palestinian separate and ostensible sovereignty with only chosen key elements of control and actual sovereignty retained by the “federal government” dominated by the present regime in Amman.

The Jordan-Palestine-Israel Model

Prince Hasan of Jordan. Has raised the idea of an Israeli–Jordanian–Palestinian federation or confederation (sometimes called the “Benelux” concept). The rationale of this concept is that the three entities must be linked economically.

The relations between the three counties according to this paradigm will resemble those of the three parties to “Benelux” (before the application of the Shengen agreements): common border control, security cooperation, common economic borders.

For maps of these plans, see maps no. 9-10.
The Benny Elon Plan – Jordan is Palestine

The Elon Peace Plan (“The Regional Path to Peace”) is today the official final-status plan of the Moledet/National Union party.

Key principles

1. **Dissolution of the Palestinian Authority** - Immediate dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, a non-viable entity with no future, whose existence precludes the termination of the conflict.

2. **Eradication of terror infrastructure** - Israel will uproot the Palestinian terror infrastructure. All arms will be collected, incitement will be stopped and all the refugee camps, which serve as incubators for terror, will be dismantled. Terrorists and their direct supporters will be deported.

3. **Recognition and Development of Jordan as the Palestinian State** - Israel, the United States and the international community will recognize the Kingdom of Jordan as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Jordan will once again recognize itself as the Palestinian nation-state.

4. In the context of a **regional economic development** program, Israel, the United States and the international community will put forth a concerted effort for the long-term development of Jordan, to rehabilitate its economy and enable it to absorb a limited number of refugees within its borders.

5. **Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza** - Israeli sovereignty will be asserted over Judea, Samaria and Gaza (the West Bank). The Arab residents of these areas will become citizens of the Palestinian state in Jordan. The status of these citizens, their connection to the two states and the manner of administration of their communal lives will be decided in an agreement between the governments of Israel and Jordan (Palestine).

6. **The Arab citizens of Israel** - those residents, who would prefer not to declare loyalty to the Jewish state, could realize their political rights in Amman’s parliament. In this way, the Jewish character of the state of Israel will be strengthened, without uprooting anyone.

7. In order to keep its Jewish character in the future, the Israeli government will adopt a systematic policy of encouraging emigration of Arabs from all of the Land of Israel, and will help anyone who wishes to find their future in other countries.

8. **Rehabilitation of refugees and completion of population exchange** - Israel, the United States and the international community will allocate resources for the completion of the exchange of populations that began in 1948, as well as the full rehabilitation of the refugees and their absorption and naturalization in various countries.

9. **Peace and normalization** - After implementation of the above stages, Israel and Jordan-Palestine will declare the conflict terminated. Both sides will work to normalize peaceful relations between all parties in the region.

For illustrative map, see map no. 11.
аблицת התוכניות

1. פירוק הרשות הפלשתית

2. חיסול הטרור

3. פיתוח ירדן כמדינת הלאום הפלשתית

4. שומרון ועזה

5. בהורים

6. שיקום הפליטים וחילופי אוכלוסין

7. מהפכות פוליטיות והליפוח

8. שלום ונו

Regional Territorial Swaps
**Israeli–Palestinian–Egyptian Land Swap**

This concept is based on Egyptian contribution of territory in Sinai in order to make Gaza viable. Two variations of this concept have been raised: (1) By Prof. Yehoshoua Ben-Aryeh – with Israeli compensation to Egypt; (2) without such compensation – by former Chairman of Judea and Samaria Council, Israel Harel.

**Land Swap with Israeli Ceding of Territory**

1. **Israel will transfer to Egypt:** (1) an area of between 250 to 500 square kilometers in the southern Negev, in the Faran Desert area and on the border with Sinai (opposite Kuntila) with the security restrictions which apply in the adjacent Egyptian section of the Sinai applied to this area; (2) a corridor-road from the edge of the above mentioned territory to the Kingdom of Jordan for a highway, railway, passage of oil, gas, and water pipelines.

2. **Egypt will transfer to the Palestinian Authority** an area at least double in size (between 500 to 1,000 square kilometers), located to the southwest of Rafah contiguous with the Gaza Strip with a coastline of some 30 km extending towards El-Arish and inland into Sinai.

3. **The Palestinian Authority will transfer to Israel** exactly the same area it receives from Egypt (500 to 1,000 square km) beyond the pre-June 4, 1967 lines.


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**Land Swap with no Israeli Ceding of Territory**

The area of the Judea, (sometimes the word appears as Judaea. It should be the same) Samaria and Gaza does not provide a territory big enough for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state; hence even a full Israeli withdrawal will not end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A long-term solution calls for a territorial contribution by other actors, particularly Egypt and Jordan.

**Main principles:**

1. **Territorial transfer from Egypt to the Palestinians** – the international community, led by the United States, shall convince Egypt to provide the Palestinians with a territory of 30,000 km$^2$ in north Sinai (less than 2% the area of Egypt). This area, in which almost no population resides, contains available ground water for agriculture and enjoys a moderate climate. With this territorial edition, the area of the Gaza Strip will grow almost 100 fold, and will be more suitable to host the world's fastest growing population – the population of Gaza.

2. **Areas A+B in Judea and Samaria** will stay Palestinian in the permanent settlement as well.

3. **Israel shall open three wide straps** serving as corridors to Jordan from the areas of Nablus, Ramallah and the Hebron Mountain.

4. **A unified Palestinian-Jordanian state** (the name of which will be decided by the two parties) will comprise of areas A and B, increasing the total Palestinian area by 100,000 km$^2$. The Hashemite royal family need not be removed, but rather a certain framework accepted by the Palestinians, such as a constitutional monarchy, shall be established.

Source: Unpublished document

For map, see map no. 12.
Israeli-Jordanian–Syrian Land Swap

Another concept of a land swap is based on a settlement for the Israeli–Syrian conflict. The key elements of this plan which has been raised in academic circles are:

1. Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights up to a line roughly run about 5 miles from the 1923 border, demarcated by the cliffs in the southern sector of the Golan about five miles from the 1923 border, thus keeping the city of Katsrin within Israel.

2. Syria will be compensated for the land in the Golan from which Israel will not withdraw by Jordan, which will cede land in the eastern part of the border between Jordan and Syria.

3. Israel will compensate Jordan by ceding an area in the Araba valley south of the Dead Sea.

See map no. 13.

Source: Unpublished papers
Comprehensive Land Swap

(Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Syria)
This plan is based on implementation of all three “land swap” plans: Israeli-Palestinian; Israel–Egypt-Palestine; Israel–Jordan–Syria. It includes:

1. **Israeli withdrawal** from the Gaza Strip, parts of the West Bank to a line defined by transportation considerations, maximal Jewish settlement, maximal security, maximal control of the holy sites and minimal Israeli annexation of Palestinian population. Israel will transfer Arab populated parts of Jerusalem to the PA, leaving the Old City under Israeli sovereignty. The area around Jerusalem and most of the Jordan Valley will be under Israeli sovereignty, while the area of Jericho will be a Palestinian enclave within Israeli territory. Corridors will connect the different parts of the Palestinian authority. Israel will evacuate settlements that interfere with creating a reasonable defendable border. These number around 30-35 settlements, populated by around 40,000 people. The evacuated settlements will be transferred in an orderly manner to the Palestinian authority.

2. **Israel will transfer Arab towns and villages in the "Triangle" to the Palestinian Authority** – reaching a decision regarding territorial autonomies in the "small Triangle", which will lead a local governmental system. When the negotiations with the Palestinians will be resumed, they will come under Palestinian sovereignty. The transferred territory will include the areas of Wadi Ara, Baka el-Gharbia, Taybe and the southern area of the “Triangle”. A little more than 200,000 Arabs reside in this territory.

4. **Israel will transfer to Egypt**: (1) an area of between 250 to 500 square kilometers in the southern Negev, in the area of the Faran Desert and on the border with the Egyptian Sinai (opposite Kuntila) with the security restrictions which apply in the adjacent section of the Sinai applied to this area; (2) a corridor-road for a highway, railway, passage of oil, gas, and water pipelines from the edge of the territory annexed by Egypt to the Kingdom of Jordan.

5. **Egypt will transfer to the Palestinian Authority** an area at least double in size (between 500 to 1,000 square kilometers), located to the south of Rafah in the Gaza Strip with a coastline of some 30 km extending towards El-Arish and inland into Sinai.

6. **The Palestinian Authority will transfer to Israel** exactly the same area it receives from Egypt (500 to 1,000 square km) beyond the pre-June 4, 1967 lines.

7. Israel will **withdraw from the Golan Heights** up to a line roughly demarcated by the cliffs in the southern sector of the Golan, approximately five miles from the 1923 border, thus keeping the city of Katsrin within Israel.

8. **Syria will be compensated** for the land in the Golan from which Israel will not withdraw by Jordan, which will cede land in the eastern part of the border between Jordan and Syria.

9. **Israel will compensate Jordan** by ceding an area in the Araba valley south of the Dead Sea.

See map no. 14.
**Historic Plans**

**The Royal Commission (Peel Commission) plan, July 1937**

The Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel was established to investigate the situation in Palestine following the outbreak of the "Arab Rebellion" in 1936, and came out with recommendations. The commission published its recommendations in 1937, and its main principles were: The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. Palestine will be partitioned into two states – Jewish and Arab, and a corridor under British Mandate, will connect Jerusalem and Jaffa.

- The Jewish state will include – the coastal area, the Jezreel valley, the northern villages and the Galilee.
- The rest of the land will be annexed to Transjordan and will become part of an independent Arab country.
- Britain will also get a Mandate over Nazareth and the Kineret Lake. For a transition period, the Mandate over the mixed towns – Tiberia, Safad, Haifa, and acre – will continue.
- Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population.
- A special commission will be established to define and demarcation the exact location of the borderline.

See map no. 16.

**The U.N. Resolution 181 – The Partition Plan 1947**

The U.N. resolution 181 of November 29th, 1947, was a partition plan aimed to separate the land into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The plan divided the land into seven regions:

- **The Jewish State** – will consist of three main regions:
  1. The east of Galilee and Israel valley;
  2. The coast plain, including Haifa up to Beer-Tuviya in the south, and Jaffa will become an Arab enclave;
  3. The Negev (without Beer-Sheba).
- **The Arab State** will also include three main regions:
  1. The mountain ridge area up to the Jordan River;
  2. The upper and western Galilee;
  3. The southern coastal area and part of the desert.
- **International supervision** on Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

See map no. 17.

**The 1949 Armistice Lines and The June 4th, 1967 Borders**

As a result of the 1948 War of Independence between Israel and its neighbors, the Security Council in November 1948, called Israel and the Arab countries to open negotiations on armistice. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria responded positively. As a result – armistice agreements were concluded between Israel and Egypt (January 1949), Israel and Jordan (March 1949), Israel and Jordan (April 1949), and Israel and Syria (July 1949). In fact, these agreements were military in
their nature, and they were almost identical to the cease-fire lines. It was decided that they are not political or territorial boundaries.

The armistice agreements concluded between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in 1949, assumed that the transition period until the signing of peace agreements will be short. However, they remained in force until the "Six Day War" which broke out on June 4th 1967. Between the signing of the armistice and the outbreak of the Six Day War, there were minor changes, which reflected the results of local hostilities between Israel and Syria and local initiatives along the southern border with Jordan.

See map no. 18.

**The Yigal Alon Plan**

Immediately after the Six-Day War, Minister Yigal Alon presented a plan to PM Levi Eshkol to divide the Judea and Samaria into Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian units. This is known as Yigal Alon Plan.

According to the plan, three main Arab enclaves would be annexed to Jordan to become a type of Jordanian-Palestinian bloc: a northern enclave that includes the cities Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Ramallah; a southern enclave covering Hebron and Bethlehem; and a third enclave which covered Jericho and its surrounding Arab towns. This plan would leave the approximately 600,000 Palestinians in the West Bank under Arab rule.

Alon stated that "both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute towards a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population". To ensure this goal, the Alon Plan placed Israel's strategic zone just to the east of the dense Arab population concentrated westward through the West Bank.

The strategic zone was to be an Israeli-controlled desert zone rising from the Jordan Valley up to the eastern slopes of the West Bank hills. This defensive area encompassed 33% of the 5,439 sq. km. of the entire West Bank.

The Alon plan has never become a formal Israeli policy, but in fact, there is a correlation between the location of Jewish settlements across the "1967 borders", and the Alon plan.

See map no. 19.

**The Oslo and Cairo Accords (1993)**

The “Oslo Process” relates to a series of accords between Israel and the PLO – later the Palestinian Authority regarding mutual steps and interim withdrawals on the road to permanent status negotiations. These accords were:

1. **The Oslo Accords** – (negotiated in secret in Oslo, Norway and signed September 13, 1993, Washington DC by PM of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin and Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat). Also known as “The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”. The accords specify principles for a five-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule leading to a permanent status agreement. The main points: Transfer of Powers to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Jericho and the Gaza strip (the "first redeployment"); deferring sensitive “permanent status issues”, such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders to the permanent status negotiations which were supposed to begin “as soon as possible” but not later than May 1996 and to be implemented by May 1999;
Israel retained responsibility for international borders and the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan and for the overall security of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli settlements in those areas, and freedom of movement on roads; agreement regarding the election of a Palestinian Council;

2. **Oslo II (or Taba)** “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” – this agreement was signed September 24, 1995 in Taba in Egypt, and countersigned four days later in Washington. The agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas:
   A. **Area A**: includes all the areas from which Israeli military control has been transferred to the administration of the Palestinian Authority, including the areas of Gaza and Jericho, and the seven major Palestinian population centers in the West Bank -- Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron. In these areas, the Palestinian Authority now has full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full responsibility for civil affairs.
   B. **Area B**: includes 450 Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank. In these areas, as in Area A, the Palestinian Authority controls all civil authority. It differs from Area A in that Israel maintains overriding security authority in order to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism.
   C. **Area C**: comprised of the unpopulated areas of the West Bank, including areas of strategic importance to Israel and the settlements, where Israel retains full responsibility for security.

Other issues related to the Oslo II agreement: safe passage to Palestinians wishing to travel between the West Bank and Gaza; change of the Palestinian Covenant by the Palestinian National Council. Palestinian guarantee of free access to, respect the ways of worship in, and not make any changes to, the Jewish holy sites” on land given up by Israel; permission for a Palestinian "police force" of 24,000 personnel to provide security in areas administered by the Palestinian Authority and to combat terrorism; a temporary international presence (TIPH) to be established in Hebron.

3. **The Hebron Protocol** (January 15 1997) – brought about Israeli troop withdrawals from 80 percent of Hebron, the last West Bank city under Israeli occupation.

4. **The Wye River Memorandum** – (signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat on October 23, 1998). The Memorandum includes articles relating to further redeployment by Israel to consist of the transfer to the Palestinian side of 13 percent from Area C (1 percent to Area A and 12 percent to Area B) and 14.2 from Area B to Area A; enhanced Palestinian effort to combat terrorism (a policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence, arrest of terrorists and a program for the collection and appropriate handling of illegal firearms; cessation of incitement by the Palestinians; steps to reaffirm the change of the Palestinian Covenant by the PLO; resumption of permanent status negotiation on an accelerated basis.

See map no. 20.